Revocation of Gift Deed Supreme Court October 2024: Key Legal Principles Explained
Table of Contents
When Can a Gift Deed Be Revoked? Supreme Court’s Ruling of October 2024
1. Remsons Industries Limited V. National Stock Exchange of India Limited.
Citation: Remson industries Limited v. National stock exchange of India Limited, Appeal no. 864 of 2022, securities appellate tribunal at Mumbai, decided by Hon’ble justice P.S Dinesh Kumar, Hon’ble Meera Swarup(T), Hon’ble Dr. Dheeraj Bhatnagar (T), dated 26.09.2024.
The Tribunal held that to be eligible for exemption from the corporate governance provisions under Regulation 23 of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015, a company must satisfy both conditions of Regulation 15(2)(a): its paid-up equity share capital should not exceed ₹10 crores and its net worth should not exceed ₹25 crores.
The case revolved around the interpretation of the exemption criteria for listed companies from certain corporate governance requirements, specifically regarding the disclosure of Related Party Transactions. Remsons Industries Limited argued that it was exempt from these requirements, but the Tribunal clarified that both the paid-up equity share capital and net worth conditions must be satisfied for the exemption to apply. This decision is significant for listed companies and market participants, as it reinforces the strict interpretation of exemption provisions under SEBI’s LODR Regulations and highlights the necessity for companies to ensure compliance with both thresholds for availing regulatory relaxations.
2. Grand Motors Sales and Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs. VE Commercial Vehicles Ltd.
Citation: Grand Motors Sales and Services Pvt. Ltd. v. VE Commercial Vehicles Ltd., 2024 SCC OnlineDel 6436, High Court of Delhi, decided by Hon’ble Justice C. Hari Shankar, dated 09.09.2024.
This matter arose from a petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, wherein Grand Motors Sales and Services Pvt. Ltd. sought to challenge an arbitral award rendered in a dispute with VE Commercial Vehicles Ltd. The crux of the dispute pertained to the interpretation of the jurisdictional clauses within the Dealership Agreement. While the agreement stipulated Delhi as the seat of arbitration, it also contained an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the courts at Indore. The respondent objected to the maintainability of the petition before the Delhi High Court, contending that only the courts at Indore possessed jurisdiction by virtue of the exclusive jurisdiction clause.
The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi, after a detailed examination of the relevant legal principles, held that the designation of the seat of arbitration is determinative of the court having exclusive supervisory jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings. The Court observed that the “seat” of arbitration carries primacy over any conflicting exclusive jurisdiction clause, in line with the settled position of law as laid down by the Supreme Court of India. Accordingly, the objection to the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court was rejected. This decision is significant as it reaffirms the legal principle that the seat of arbitration governs curial jurisdiction, thereby providing greater certainty and predictability in arbitration law and practice in India.
3.Amogh Industrial Products V. Mrichi Developers Pvt Ltd
Amogh Industrial Products v. Mrichi Developers Pvt Ltd, CP(IB) No. 103/9/HDB/2024, In the National Company Law Tribunal, Hyderabad, decided by Dr. Venkata Ramakrishna Badarinath Nandula, Hon’ble Member (Judicial), Sh. Charan Singh, Hon’ble Member (Technical), dated 11.09.2024.
https://ibclaw.in/amogh-industrial-products-vs-mirchi-developers-pvt-ltd-nclt-hyderabad-bench/
The NCLT held that the petition filed under Section 9 of the IBC was maintainable and that there was a clear default in payment of the operational debt. The Tribunal found that the operational creditor had provided sufficient evidence of the debt, and the corporate debtor had failed to make the payment despite the demand notice, thus satisfying the conditions under Section 9 for initiating the CIRP. The Tribunal accepted the petition and appointed an Interim Resolution Professional to oversee the process. The case arose from a dispute regarding unpaid dues for goods and services supplied by Amogh Industrial Products to Mrichi Developers Pvt Ltd. The operational creditor, Amogh Industrial Products, had issued a demand notice under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, and upon non-payment, filed a petition for initiating insolvency proceedings.
The Tribunal’s decision highlights the importance of timely payment of operational debts by corporate debtors and demonstrates the effectiveness of the statutory mechanism for operational creditors to seek redressal in cases of default. This judgment is relevant for companies and creditors as it reaffirms the procedural requirements and evidentiary standards for initiating CIRP under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.
4.MS. X v. Internal Complaints Committee
Ms. X v. Internal Complaints Committee, ANI Technologies Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., Writ Petition No. 8127 of 2019 (GM-RES), In the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, decided by Hon’ble Justice M.G.S. Kamal, dated 30.09.2024.
The Karnataka High Court held that cab-aggregator drivers, specifically those engaged by ANI Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (Ola), are to be considered ‘employees’ for the purposes of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013.
The case arose from a complaint of sexual harassment by a passenger against an Ola driver. The petitioner’s attempts to seek redressal through Ola’s ICC were met with inaction, as Ola claimed the driver was not an employee but an independent contractor. The Court found that the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) and Ola were obligated to inquire into complaints of sexual harassment by passengers against drivers, despite claims by Ola that drivers were independent contractors and not employees. The Court observed that the definition of ‘employee’ under the POSH Act is wide enough to include persons engaged in contract, and the ICC’s refusal to act was a violation of the Act. The Court directed the ICC and Ola to pay compensation to the petitioner, and to conduct an inquiry into the complaint as per the provisions of the POSH Act.
5.Gita Refactories Pvt. Ltd. V. Tuaman engineering Limited.Gita Refractories Pvt Ltd v. Tuaman Engineering Limited, AP-COM/707/2024, In the High Court of Calcutta, decided by Hon’ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, dated 10.09.2024.
The Calcutta High Court held that the provisions of MSME Act do not bar independent arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, where an arbitration clause exists in the agreement between the parties. The Court observed that Section 18(1) of the MSME Act, which provides for dispute resolution through the Facilitation Council, uses the word “may,” indicating that parties have the option to choose between statutory dispute resolution and other legal remedies, including arbitration under the Arbitration Act. The Court clarified that the mandatory provisions of the MSME Act only apply if a party chooses to submit to the jurisdiction of the Facilitation Council.
This case involved a dispute between a registered MSME, Gita Refractories Pvt Ltd, and Tuaman Engineering Limited, regarding non-payment and non-acceptance of goods, as well as claims for compensation and specific performance. The respondent argued that the dispute should be referred to the Facilitation Council under the MSME Act, while the petitioner sought arbitration under the Arbitration Act, citing the arbitration clause in their agreement. The Court’s decision clarifies the interplay between the MSME Act and the Arbitration Act, emphasizing that parties are not restricted from pursuing arbitration under the Arbitration Act merely because a remedy is available under the MSME Act.
6.The Karnataka Lokayukta & ors. V. Sri. Ishwar
The Karnataka Lokayukta & ors. V. Sri. Ishwar, Writ Petition No. 105477 of 2023 (S-KAT), In the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench, decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Krishna S. Dixit and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vijaykumar A. Patil, dated 03.09.2024.
The Karnataka High Court held that the Lokayukta has locus standi to challenge orders of the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal when the Tribunal invalidates disciplinary actions on grounds of legal or procedural infirmities in the Lokayukta’s inquiry process. The Court emphasized that the Lokayukta, as a statutory body combating maladministration, can approach the writ court if the competent authority fails to challenge the Tribunal’s order within a reasonable timeframe, despite being notified. However, this locus is not automatic and depends on the case’s facts, such as whether the Tribunal’s findings directly implicate the Lokayukta’s procedural compliance. The Bench also ruled that the Tribunal erred in foreclosing proceedings without remanding the matter for fresh consideration, especially when the delinquent employee remained in service.
The case arose from the Lokayukta’s petition against KSAT’s order to quash the compulsory retirement of Sri. Ishwar, a Gram Panchayat Secretary, for alleged misconduct. KSAT had invalidated the punishment citing non-compliance with Section 9(3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984, which mandates procedural fairness during inquiries. The High Court’s decision underscores the Lokayukta’s institutional role in ensuring accountability in public administration and clarifies the interplay between statutory bodies and judicial tribunals in disciplinary matters. This judgment is significant for administrative law, as it balances the autonomy of disciplinary authorities with judicial oversight, ensuring that procedural lapses do not undermine legitimate inquiries into misconduct.
7.Navin Chandra Mishra (Suspended Director of CMR Lifesciences Pvt. Ltd.) Vs. Nand Kishore Palaha and Ors.
Navin Chandra Mishra (Suspended Director of CMR Lifesciences Pvt. Ltd.) v. Nand Kishore Palaha and Ors., Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1851 of 2024, National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, decided by Hon’ble Justice Ashok Bhushan (Chairperson), Mr. Barun Mitra (Technical Member), and Mr. Arun Baroka (Technical Member), dated 27.09.2024. https://ibclaw.in/navin-chandra-mishra-suspended-director-of-cmr-lifesciences-pvt-ltd-vs-nand-kishore-palaha-and-ors-nclat-new-delhi/
The NCLAT upheld the NCLT Ahmedabad’s decision to admit a Section 7 insolvency application under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), despite the pendency of a civil suit filed by the corporate debtor. The Tribunal ruled that the existence of a civil suit (No. 193/2017) initiated by CMR Lifesciences Pvt. Ltd. after the winding-up petition’s transfer to the NCLT did not bar the admission of the Section 7 application, as the financial creditor had sufficiently proven the debt and default. The NCLAT emphasized that insolvency proceedings under IBC are independent of parallel civil disputes, and the adjudicating authority’s duty is limited to verifying the existence of debt and default, which were established in this case.
The case arose from a petition filed by the financial creditor, Nand Kishore Palaha, seeking initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process against CMR Lifesciences Pvt. Ltd. The corporate debtor argued that the pending civil suit, which involved disputes over transactions between the parties, should preclude insolvency proceedings. However, the NCLAT clarified that the IBC’s objective is to resolve insolvency expeditiously, and the pendency of a civil suit cannot override the statutory mandate to admit a Section 7 application when debt and default are proven. This judgment reinforces the principle that insolvency proceedings are not subordinate to other legal disputes and underscores the tribunals’ focus on factual defaults rather than peripheral litigation
8.Hdb Financial Services Ltd. vs M/S. Somanis & Anr
HDB Financial Services Ltd. v. M/S. Somanis & Anr., Revision Petition No. 1065 of 2021, National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, decided by Hon’ble AVM J. Rajendra, AVSM VSM (Retd.), Presiding Member, dated 29.08.2024.
The NCDRC ruled that loans granted to sole proprietorship firms do not qualify as “individual borrowing” under the RBI guidelines. The Commission emphasized that the RBI’s 2014 and 2019 circulars prohibiting prepayment penalties for individual borrowers do not apply to proprietorships, as they are distinct legal entities. The NCDRC held that HDB Financial Services was entitled to levy prepayment charges under the terms of the 2015 loan agreement, as the RBI’s 2019 circular could not be applied retrospectively. The decision relied on the Madras High Court’s interpretation in S. Manoharan v. Reserve Bank of India, which clarified that proprietorships fall outside the scope of “individual borrowers” under RBI regulations.
The case arose from a dispute over prepayment penalties charged by HDB Financial Services on a ₹4 crore loan granted to M/S. Somanis, a proprietorship firm. The complainant argued that the penalties violated RBI guidelines, but the NCDRC upheld the contractual terms, noting that the loan was executed before the 2019 circular and that regulatory changes cannot retroactively alter binding agreements. This judgment clarifies the legal distinction between individual and proprietorship borrowers under RBI norms and reinforces the enforceability of prepayment clauses in commercial loan agreements. It is significant for financial institutions and businesses, as it underscores the necessity of adhering to contractual terms and the limited applicability of RBI guidelines to proprietorships in such contexts.
9.Lily Packers vs. Vaishnavi Vijay
Lily Packers Private Limited v. Vaishnavi Vijay Umak & Ors., Arb.P. 1210/2023, In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, decided by Hon’ble Ms. Justice Prathiba M. Singh, dated 11.07.2024
The Delhi High Court upheld the validity of lock-in periods in employment contracts, ruling that such clauses do not violate fundamental rights under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution if they operate only during the employment tenure and are reasonable. The Court emphasized that lock-in clauses restricting employees from leaving prematurely are permissible to protect employers’ investments in training and confidential information, provided they do not bar post-employment engagements. The Court also held that disputes arising from such clauses are arbitrable under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, as they fall within the scope of contractual interpretation rather than constitutional rights.
The case involved three employees who resigned before completing a 3-year lock-in period stipulated in their employment agreements. Lily Packers invoked arbitration, alleging breaches of confidentiality and intellectual property clauses. The employees contested the arbitrability, arguing the lock-in clause violated their fundamental rights. The Court rejected this, clarifying that constitutional rights are not implicated when covenants are limited to the employment period and serve legitimate business interests. This judgment reinforces the enforceability of reasonable restrictive covenants in employment contracts and affirms arbitration as a valid mechanism to resolve such disputes, balancing employer protections with employee rights.
10.Shakeel Ahmed Vs. Syed Akhlaq Hussain
Shakeel Ahmed v. Syed Akhlaq Hussain, 2023 INSC 1016, In the Supreme Court of India, decided by Hon’ble Justice Vikram Nath and Hon’ble Justice Rajesh Bindal, dated 01.11.2023.
The Supreme Court held that no right, title, or interest in immovable property can be conferred through unregistered documents such as an Agreement to Sell, Power of Attorney, Affidavit, or Will. The Court emphasized that statutory provisions under the Registration Act, 1908, and Transfer of Property Act, 1882, mandate registration for transferring ownership. The Bench ruled that unregistered documents, even if executed as “customary transfers,” are inadmissible to establish a title. The Court overturned the High Court’s decision, which had upheld a decree for possession and mesne profits based on such documents and dismissed the suit entirely.
The case arose from a dispute over property ownership, where Syed Akhlaq Hussain claimed rights through unregistered documents executed by Laiq Ahmed (the appellant’s brother). Shakeel Ahmed contested this, asserting ownership via an oral Hiba (gift). While the Trial Court and High Court ruled in favor of Hussain, the Supreme Court clarified that unregistered documents cannot substitute a valid conveyance. This judgment reinforces the necessity of registered instruments for property transactions and curbs the misuse of unregistered agreements to bypass statutory requirements.
11.M/S PGL ESTATECON PVT. LTD. V. M/S JYOTI ENTERPRISES
M/S PGL Estatecon Pvt. Ltd. v. M/S Jyoti Enterprises, O.M.P. (COMM) 99/2023, I.A. 4685/2023, In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar, dated 11.09.2024.
The Delhi High Court stayed the execution of two arbitral awards, ruling that the unilateral appointment of an arbitrator by the respondent violated Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and rendered the proceedings invalid ab initio. The Court emphasized that the arbitrator, who was the respondent’s own counsel, had an inherent conflict of interest, making his appointment impermissible under the Act. The petitioners’ repeated requests for the arbitrator’s recusal were ignored. Further the court held that such unilateral appointments bypassing court intervention under Section 11 of the Act are void, as they contravene the principles of impartiality and independence enshrined in the statute.
The case arose from disputes over arbitral awards favoring the respondent, which were challenged by the petitioners on grounds of procedural illegality. The arbitration clause allowed the respondent’s proprietor to act as arbitrator, a provision the Court deemed unenforceable due to its bias. This judgment reinforces the judiciary’s stance against unilateral arbitrator appointments in contracts, particularly when the appointee has prior ties to one party. It underscores the necessity of adhering to statutory safeguards under the Arbitration Act to ensure fair dispute resolution, setting a precedent for invalidating awards tainted by procedural impropriety.
12. The State of Bihar vs Kashish Developers Limited
The State of Bihar v. Kashish Developers Limited, Civil Review No. 181 of 2023 in Request Case No. 12 of 2023, In the High Court of Judicature at Patna, decided by Hon’ble Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran, dated 04.10.2024.
The Patna High Court held that arbitration clauses in government contracts, which designate the Engineer-in-Chief or administrative head of the Public Works Division as arbitrator, become otiose (ineffective) after the 2016 amendment to Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court ruled that such officials are ineligible to act as arbitrators under Schedule V of the Act, and their authority to appoint arbitrators is also invalidated by law. The Bench emphasized that unless parties explicitly waive Section 12(5) through an express written agreement, the arbitration clause cannot be enforced. The Court further clarified that the High Court, as a court of record under Article 215 of the Constitution, retains the power to review its own orders appointing arbitrators under Section 11 of the Act, rectifying errors apparent on record.
The case arose from disputes over construction contracts for MLA hostels in Bihar, where Kashish Developers sought arbitration. The High Court initially appointed an arbitrator, but later reviewed its decision upon realizing the arbitration clause was void due to the amended Section 12. The Court relied on Supreme Court precedents (TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering, Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC) to affirm that ineligibility of the designated appointing authority invalidates the entire arbitration mechanism under the clause. This judgment underscores the strict compliance required with post-2016 arbitration reforms, particularly in government contracts, and reinforces judicial oversight to prevent conflicts of interest in arbitrator appointments.
13. Aircastle (Ireland) Ltd vs Mr. Ashish Chawchharia The Resolution
Aircastle (Ireland) Ltd v. Mr. Ashish Chawchharia, Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 1178 of 2024, National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, decided by Hon’ble Justice Rakesh Kumar Jain (Judicial), Hon’ble Mr. Naresh Salecha (Technical), Hon’ble Mr. Indevar Pandey (Technical), dated 04.10.2024.
The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal upheld the NCLT Mumbai’s decision to reject Aircastle’s claim as a financial creditor in the CIRP of Jet Airways (India) Ltd. The Tribunal ruled that Aircastle, an aircraft lessor, failed to submit its claim within the 90-day CIRP timeline under Section 12 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), despite being aware of the insolvency proceedings. The NCLAT emphasized that the Resolution Professional (RP) acted within his authority by rejecting the delayed claim, as permitting it would disrupt the resolution process and prejudice other stakeholders. The Tribunal also noted that Aircastle’s reliance on a foreign judgment (Irish High Court) to assert ownership of aircraft was irrelevant to the IBC proceedings, which are governed by Indian law and the DGCA’s deregistration of the aircraft.
The case arose from Aircastle’s attempt to recover dues for leased aircraft after Jet Airways’ insolvency. The RP and NCLT rejected the claim due to its delayed submission, prompting Aircastle to appeal. The NCLAT’s decision reinforces the strict adherence to timelines under the IBC and clarifies that foreign lessors cannot bypass domestic insolvency protocol.
14.DELHI GYMKHANA CLUB LIMITED V. COL ASHISH KHANNA SM RETD & ORS.
Delhi Gymkhana Club Limited v. Col. Ashish Khanna SM Retd. & Ors., FAO(OS) 102/2023 & CM APPL. 49218/2023, In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, decided by Hon’ble Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Hon’ble Justice Amit Sharma, dated 27.09.2024.
The Delhi High Court upheld the strict adherence to the 120-day timeline under Chapter VII Rule 4 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 for filing written statements in non-commercial suits. The Bench dismissed the appeal, affirming that the 120-day period (30 days initially + 90 days extendable by the Registrar) is a hard stop, and courts cannot condone delays beyond this limit. The judgment relied on precedents like Ram Sarup Lugani v. Yogender Kumar and Gautam Gambhir v. Rajat Srivastava, which established that the Rules override the CPC and leave no room for discretionary extensions. The Court emphasized that the phrase “but not thereafter” in Rule 4 imposes a mandatory outer limit, rendering belated written statements inadmissible.
The case arose from a dispute where Delhi Gymkhana Club sought to file a written statement 153 days after service of summons in a suit filed by Col. Ashish Khanna. The Club’s application for condonation of delay was rejected by the Joint Registrar, a decision upheld by the Single Judge and later the Division Bench. The judgment reinforces the strict procedural discipline mandated by the Delhi High Court Rules, ensuring timely adjudication and preventing indefinite delays in civil litigation. It clarifies that even in non-commercial cases, parties must adhere to statutory timelines, balancing judicial efficiency with the rights of litigants. This ruling is critical for legal practitioners, underscoring the non-negotiable nature of procedural deadlines in Delhi High Court proceedings.
15.Dr. Neha Chandra V. Union of India
Dr. Neha Chandra v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 7083, In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, decided by Hon’ble Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav, dated 30.09.2024.
https://www.barandbench.com/news/delhi-high-court-says-fraction-cause-of-action-delhi-not-enough-invoke-jurisdiction
The Delhi High Court held that the mere existence of a fractional cause of action within Delhi is insufficient to invoke the court’s territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Bench emphasized that jurisdiction cannot be claimed solely because a petitioner resides in Delhi, or a minor procedural step occurred there, unless the substantive cause of action predominantly arose within the court’s territorial limits. The Court dismissed the petition, noting that the petitioner’s grievance related to a service dispute with the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation (ESIC) in Haryana, and the connection to Delhi was incidental.
The case arose from a challenge to an ESIC order terminating the petitioner’s services, which was issued and implemented in Haryana. While the petitioner argued that Delhi had jurisdiction because she resided there and had submitted representations to the Union Labour Ministry in Delhi, the Court ruled that these factors did not establish a substantive link to Delhi. This judgment clarifies the principles of territorial jurisdiction in writ petitions, ensuring courts are not approached based on tenuous connections.
16.Suo Motu proceedings initiated by High Court v. State of Kerala & Ors
Suo motu proceedings initiated by High court v. state of Kerela & ors., CRL.MC NO. 5136 OF 2023, High court of Kerela at Ernakulam, decided by Hon’ble justice K. Babu, dated 19.04.2024.
The Kerala High Court held that disclosing whether an accused is in India or abroad is a mandatory requirement in anticipatory bail applications, as it constitutes a material fact influencing judicial decisions. The Court directed the Registry to implement a compulsory field in bail application forms to capture this information, ensuring transparency. Failure to disclose this detail amounts to suppression of material facts, which can lead to rejection of the bail plea. The Bench emphasized that such disclosure is critical for imposing conditions under Section 482(2)(i) and (iii) of the BNSS, such as ensuring the accused’s availability for interrogation and restricting international travel without court permission.
The case arose from concerns over accused individuals filing anticipatory bail petitions while abroad, often without disclosing their location, thereby evading arrest. The Court referenced its earlier decision in Anu Mathew v. State of Kerala (2023), which clarified that while anticipatory bail pleas from abroad are permissible, courts must assess whether the accused absconded or had legitimate reasons for being overseas. This ruling reinforces procedural integrity in bail proceedings, preventing misuse by accused persons seeking to bypass legal processes.
17. FLFL Travel Retail Lucknow Private Limited Vs. Airports Authority of India and Ors.
FLFL Travel Retail Lucknow Private Limited v. Airports Authority of India and Ors., O.M.P. (COMM) 485/2022 & I.A. 20548/2022, In the High Court of Delhi, decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Prateek Jalan, dated 08.10.2024.
The Delhi High Court set aside the arbitral award on the grounds that the learned arbitrator failed to disclose his prior appointment by the respondent in another arbitration during the pendency of the present proceedings, thereby violating Section 12(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Additionally, the Court found that the arbitrator breached the principles of natural justice under Section 24(3) of the Act by not providing the petitioner timely access to crucial documents submitted by the respondent, which were material to the dispute. The petitioner was given only one working day to respond to voluminous documents, which the Court held was unjustifiable and prejudicial. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition under Section 34 of the Act and set aside the award. The case concerned disputes under a Concession Agreement for operating retail outlets at various airports, including Lucknow Airport, where the petitioner sought rebates/refunds of concession fees due to delays and other issues. The arbitrator awarded approximately Rs. 20 lakhs out of the petitioner’s claims exceeding Rs. 2.32 crores. The petitioner challenged the award primarily on the grounds of nondisclosure of conflict of interest by the arbitrator and procedural unfairness in document sharing.
18 Hiya Impex V. Hapag Lloyd India Pvt.Ltd. & Anr.
Hiya Impex v. Hapag Lloyd India Pvt. Ltd. & anr., 2024: BHC-OS:15345, High court of Bombay, decided by Hon’ble justice R.I. CHAGLA, dated 30.09.2024.
The case arose from a dispute where the carrier, Hapag Lloyd, refused to deliver cargo to the consignee (Hiya Impex) despite payment, citing a Benin Court order directing delivery to new buyers presented by the shipper. The plaintiff argued that the Benin order was not enforceable in India and not binding on them. The Bombay High Court upheld the right of a named consignee to delivery of cargo under a non-negotiable bill of lading, holding that the carrier’s obligation to deliver the cargo to the consignee is not affected by a foreign court order to which the consignee was not a party.
The Court found that the order of the Benin Court did not bind the plaintiff, as the plaintiff was not a party to those proceedings and the order was not on merits as per Section 13(b) of the CPC. The Court noted that the plaintiff, as the consignee and holder of the bills of lading, had paid all freight and charges and was therefore entitled to delivery of the cargo, especially since the cargo was at risk of being damaged or losing value. The Court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff even at the ad-interim stage, emphasizing the urgency and the clear entitlement of the consignee.
19. Amardeep Singh Bedi Vs. Union of India and Ors.
Amardeep Singh Bedi v. Union of India & Anr., 2024 DHC 7643, W.P.(C) 12597/2024, In the High Court of Delhi, decided by Hon’ble Justice Sanjeev Narula, dated 01.10.2024
The Delhi High Court held that the mere pendency of a criminal case does not automatically disqualify an individual from exercising their right to seek long-term opportunities abroad, such as applying for a visa to establish a business in another country. The Court emphasized that denying a Police Clearance Certificate (PCC) solely on the basis of pending FIRs, in the absence of any conviction or finding of guilt, constitutes an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution to engage in any lawful business or occupation. The petitioner, who had a valid passport and no travel restrictions, was seeking a PCC required for Canada’s Start-up Visa Programme. The Court directed the respondents to issue a PCC to the petitioner, clearly mentioning the pending criminal cases, thus ensuring transparency for the foreign authorities while protecting the petitioner’s constitutional rights.
The case arose from the petitioner’s challenge to the refusal of a PCC by the authorities, who cited pending FIRs related to alleged non-deposit of employee provident fund contributions. The petitioner had already fulfilled his liability under the EPF Act and had been granted anticipatory bail, with no restrictions on his travel. The Court found it inconsistent that the passport authorities renewed the petitioner’s passport for a decade without objection but now refused to issue a PCC due to the pending cases. The judgment clarifies that the role of a PCC is to provide accurate information to foreign authorities, not to impose blanket restrictions on an individual’s right to work and freedom of movement. This decision is significant for individuals with pending criminal cases who wish to pursue opportunities abroad, as it reaffirms the balance between law enforcement obligations and constitutional freedoms.
20.Neelam Gupta vs Rajendra Kumar Gupta
Neelam Gupta & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta & Anr., 2024 INSC 769, Civil Appeal Nos. 3159-3160 of 2019, Supreme Court of India, decided by Hon’ble justice C.T Ravikumar, dated 14.10.2024.
The Supreme Court upheld the Chhattisgarh High Court’s decision, rejecting the appellants’ claim of adverse possession and affirming Rajendra Kumar Gupta’s title over the disputed property. The Court ruled that permissive possession (e.g., through tenancy or familial arrangements) cannot evolve into adverse possession unless the possessor demonstrates hostile intent (animus possidendi) and open, continuous possession for the statutory period under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The appellants, who claimed possession since 1968, failed to prove when their possession turned adverse or met the prescriptive period requirements. Additionally, the Court clarified that a minor can be a transferee of immovable property under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, but cannot act as a transferor, validating the 1968 sale deed executed in favor of the respondent during his minority.
The case arose from a dispute over 7.60 acres of land, where Rajendra Kumar Gupta claimed ownership through a 1968 sale deed, while the appellants alleged it was joint family property and asserted adverse possession. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, but the High Court reversed this, emphasizing the respondent’s proven title and the appellants’ failure to establish adverse possession. The Supreme Court’s judgment reinforces the stringent requirements for adverse possession claims, particularly in familial or permissive contexts, and underscores that mere long-term possession without hostile intent is insufficient. This ruling is significant for property law, as it safeguards rightful ownership against unsubstantiated adverse possession claims and clarifies minors’ rights as transferees in property transaction
21.Bruhath Bangalore Mahanagara Palike vs State Of Karnataka
Bruhath Bangalore Mahanagar Palike officer and employee’s welfare association v. state of Karnataka, WRIT PETITION NO.7775 OF 2020 (S-RES), High court of karnataka at Bangalore, decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sachin Shankar Magadum , dated 25.09.2024.
The case arose from a challenge by the BBMP Officer and Employees Welfare Association, which contended that Chapter VI of the BBMP Act, 2020, exclusively vests municipal governance and appointment powers with the BBMP. The petitioners argued that the State could not assume the role of appointing authority for Group A posts through subordinate legislation. The High Court dismissed the petition, finding no material evidence that the State exceeded its authority or acted in contravention of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976, or the BBMP Act, 2020.
The Karnataka High Court upheld the constitutional validity of Rule 4(a) of the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (General Cadre and Recruitment of Officers and Employees) Rules, 2018, confirming the State Government’s authority to appoint Group ‘A’ officers in the BBMP. The Court emphasized that this reserved power is a constitutional safeguard to ensure efficiency, competency, and alignment with broader state policies. Judicial precedents were cited to reinforce the state’s supervisory role over local bodies, ensuring that strategic, merit-based, and non-partisan appointments are made to senior positions. The Court stated that the State’s retention of power to appoint Group A officers is in line with its statutory powers and administrative control over local bodies like the BBMP, which are financially and functionally dependent on the state. Importantly, the Court noted that direct state involvement in these appointments’ safeguards senior posts from local political interference, promoting objective and merit-based recruitment.
22.Vishal Ramesh Khatwani Vs. State of Karnataka
Vishal Ramesh Khatwani v. State of Karnataka, Criminal Revision Petition No. 210/2024, In the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice V. Srishananda, dated 04.10.2024.
The Karnataka High Court allowed the criminal revision petition and issued comprehensive guidelines for Magistrates regarding the release of seized properties under Sections 451 and 457 of CrPC or under Section 497 of BNSS. The Court observed that the State Government is required to frame necessary rules for the disposal of all seized properties, including electronic devices, digital devices, medical samples, food items, highly inflammable products, perishable objects, and precious metals. Until such rules are framed, the Court’s directions serve as model guidelines for Trial Magistrates. The Court specified that the seizure mahazar must include detailed descriptions, serial numbers, manufacturer’s name, distinctive marks, and the approximate value of the seized property. Magistrates must personally verify the seized items and ensure they match the mahazar. Unless specific grounds are made out by the Investigating Agency, seized property should not be retained by them. If retention is permitted, Magistrates must pass a reasoned order, ensuring the Investigating Agency acts as a bailee and preserves the property. Additional guidelines address the preservation of electronic and digital evidence, handling of perishable and inflammable items, and procedures for seized cash and vehicles. The Court emphasized that these directions are only indicative and not exhaustive, and are meant to guide Magistrates in the proper disposal of seized properties.
23.State Of Kerala vs Sreenath & Others
State of Kerala v. Sreenath and Others, 2024 LiveLive (Ker) 74890, Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 437 of 2009, In the High Court of Kerala, decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. Babu, dated 06.11.2024.
The Kerala High Court allowed the State’s plea to withdraw prosecution against four accused in a 20-year-old criminal trespass case, citing the trivial nature of the offence, lack of mens rea, and the reformation and positive contributions of the accused as decisive factors. The Court observed that the accused, who were college students at the time of the incident, had participated in a protest march following the suicide of a fellow student denied a bank loan for higher education. The protest, which was obstructed by local people, escalated, resulting in the accused allegedly pelting stones that damaged the window glass of the Treasury building, causing a loss of only ₹250. The Court noted the lack of evidence to specifically attribute the act to each accused, the absence of criminal antecedents, and the fact that most of the accused had since become dedicated social workers or political leaders. The Court held that withdrawal of prosecution would serve public interest by maintaining social order and benefiting the community, as the accused had demonstrated reformed behavior and contributed positively to society.
The case originated from a 2004 incident in which the accused were charged under Section 447 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (criminal trespass with common intention) and Section 3(2)(c) of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (mischief causing damage to public property). The Magistrate initially rejected the State’s application to withdraw prosecution, doubting the application of mind by the Assistant Public Prosecutor. On revision, the High Court set aside the Magistrate’s order, emphasizing that the nature of the offence, the lack of mens rea, and the reformation of the accused are valid considerations for withdrawal of prosecution under Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court discharged the accused, highlighting the importance of considering the broader context of the case and the accused’s subsequent positive contributions to society.
24.Chandramani Nanda vs Sarat Chandra SwainChandramani Nanda v. Sarat Chandra Swain, 2024 INSC 777, Supreme Court of India, Hon’ble Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Hon’ble justice Rajesh Bindal, dated 15.10.2024.
The Supreme Court held that a claimant’s rough calculation of compensation in accident cases cannot act as a bar or upper limit for courts to award higher amounts if justified by evidence. The Bench emphasized that Motor Accident Claims Tribunals and High Courts are duty-bound to assess fair compensation independently, even if it exceeds the claimed amount, provided it is just and reasonable. Rejecting the insurance company’s argument that the claimant’s initial demand of ₹30 lakh capped the compensation, the Court enhanced the award from ₹30.99 lakh to ₹52.31 lakh, factoring in the appellant’s 100% functional disability, revised income assessment, future attendant charges, and loss of marriage prospects.
The case arose from a 2014 accident in Odisha where the appellant suffered severe injuries, including brain damage, leading to permanent disability. While the Tribunal awarded ₹20.60 lakh and the High Court raised it to ₹30.99 lakh, the Supreme Court intervened to ensure comprehensive compensation reflecting the true extent of the appellant’s losses. This judgment clarifies that claimants are not restricted by their initial estimates, and courts must prioritize equitable compensation over procedural technicalities. It reinforces the judiciary’s role in safeguarding victims’ rights, particularly in cases involving catastrophic injuries, ensuring that compensation aligns with the actual impact on the victim’s life and livelihood.
25. Cholamandlam Ms General Insurance V. Vikrant Oil Carrier and Others
2024: PHHC:128571, Punjab-Haryana High Court, VINOD S. BHARDWAJ, dated 27.09.2024.
‘Failed to establish negligence in handling of vehicle by driver’; P&H HC directed Insurance Company to pay Rs. 54, 650 to oil carrier company for damage caused to its oil tanker
The Punjab and Haryana High Court partly set aside the award passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat (Public Utility Services), Jind, modifying the compensation amount payable by the insurance company to the oil carrier for damage caused to its oil tanker. The Court directed the insurance company to pay Rs. 54,650 as assessed by the surveyor, along with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing the application until realization, and also awarded additional litigation expenses of Rs. 15,000. The Court found no evidence of negligence or invalidity of the driver’s certified training, which was a prerequisite for the driving license endorsement. It held that the Permanent Lok Adalat had exercised its equitable jurisdiction fairly, and the insurance company’s objections were duly considered but did not warrant complete reversal of the award.
The case arose from a claim by Vikrant Oil Carrier for damages to its oil tanker insured with Cholamandalam MS General Insurance. The insurer repudiated the claim on grounds that the driver lacked a valid endorsement to drive a vehicle carrying hazardous goods. The Permanent Lok Adalat ruled in favor of the oil carrier, awarding Rs. 1,30,000, which the insurer challenged. The High Court’s judgment clarifies that compliance with certified training requirements and absence of negligence are critical in insurance claims involving specialized vehicles. It also affirms the limited scope of judicial interference in awards passed by Lok Adalats, emphasizing fairness and equity in adjudication.
26.Neelam Gupta & Ors. V. Rajendra Kumar Gupta & Anr.
Neelam Gupta & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta & Anr., 2024 INSC 769, Supreme Court of India, decided by Hon’ble Justice C.T. Ravikumar and Hon’ble justice Sanjay Kumar, dated 14.10.2024.
The case concerned a dispute over land ownership where the plaintiff claimed title through a registered sale deed, while the defendants asserted adverse possession. The Trial Court and appellate court initially ruled against the plaintiff, but the High Court reversed those findings, which the Supreme Court upheld. The Supreme Court held that a minor can be a transferee of immovable property but cannot be a transferor, clarifying the legal position under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Court emphasized that adverse possession claims by tenants or persons in permissive possession cannot succeed unless they establish hostile possession (animus possidendi) that is open, continuous, and adverse to the true owner’s title for the statutory period. The Court reiterated that once the plaintiff proves title, the burden shifts to the defendant claiming adverse possession to prove uninterrupted adverse possession starting from a specific date. The Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the High Court’s decision that permissive possession by the defendants did not convert into adverse possession, and the suit for recovery of possession was rightly allowed in favor of the plaintiff.
27.R.P. GARG V. THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER, TELECOM DEPARTMENT & ORS.
2024 INSC 743, IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, dated 10.09.2024.
R.P. Garg v. The Chief General Manager, Telecom Department & Ors., 2024 INSC 743, Supreme Court of India, decided by Hon’ble justice P.S Narsimha, dated 10.09.2024.
The Supreme Court held that post-award interest under Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is a statutory right that cannot be excluded by contractual agreements. The Court clarified that while parties may contractually prohibit pre-award interest under Section 31(7)(a), post-award interest is mandatory unless the arbitral award explicitly directs otherwise. The phrase “unless the award otherwise directs” in Section 31(7)(b) applies only to the rate of interest, not the entitlement itself. The Court overruled the High Court’s reliance on Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. v. Tehri Hydro Development Corporation, which dealt with pre-award interest, and restored the District Court’s decision granting the appellant 18% post-award interest from the award date until realization. This ruling affirmed that statutory provisions for post-award interest override contractual clauses attempting to exclude it.
The case arose from a dispute over unpaid bills under a 1997 contract for trenching and laying cables, where the arbitrator denied interest due to a contractual prohibition. The Supreme Court emphasized that post-award interest serves to ensure timely compliance with arbitral awards and compensates for delays in payment. By distinguishing between pre-award and post-award interest, the judgment reinforces the autonomy of statutory rights over party agreements in arbitration, ensuring award-holders are not disadvantaged by contractual limitations. This decision is pivotal for arbitration practice, clarifying that parties cannot waive post-award interest through contracts and affirming the arbitrator’s duty to apply statutory mandates irrespective of contractual terms.
28.Gammon Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd. V. Rohit Sood
Gammon Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd. v. Rohit Sood, 2024 LawText (BOM) (10) 165, Arbitration Petition (ARBP) (L) No. 28089 of 2022, In the High Court of Bombay, decided by Hon’ble justice M.S Sonak & Hon’ble justice Jitendra S Jain, dated 16.10.2024.
The Bombay High Court held that the jurisdiction clause in the original arbitration agreement governs challenges to arbitral awards under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, even if the award was passed under Section 18(4) of the MSMED Act, 2006. The Court clarified that while the MSMED Act facilitates arbitration at the supplier’s location for convenience, it does not override the parties’ contractual agreement on jurisdiction. The arbitration venue under the MSMED Act is distinct from the “seat” of arbitration, which determines the court’s jurisdiction for post-award proceedings. The Court emphasized that the MSMED Act does not explicitly bar parties from adhering to their original jurisdiction clause, and thus, the petitioner’s challenge to the award must be filed in Mumbai (as per the original agreement) and not in Shimla (the supplier’s location).
The case arose from a dispute where the respondent (Rohit Sood), an MSME supplier, initiated arbitration under the MSMED Act through the Shimla Facilitation Council. The petitioner contested the award’s jurisdiction, citing the original contract’s exclusive jurisdiction clause favoring Mumbai courts. The High Court’s decision reinforces the primacy of contractual jurisdiction clauses in arbitration agreements and clarifies that the MSMED Act’s procedural provisions for supplier convenience do not displace the parties’ agreed-upon seat of arbitration.
29.IDBI Bank Ltd. vs. Ramswaroop Daliya and Others
IDBI Bank Ltd.v. Ramswaroop Daliya & ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 11115-11116 of 2024 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 8159-8160 of 2023), IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, decided by Hon’ble justice Pankaj Mithal and Hon’ble justice R. Mahadevan, dated 16.10.2024.
The Supreme Court held that the unilateral cancellation of an auction sale by IDBI Bank Ltd. without affording the auction purchaser a hearing violated the principles of natural justice. The Court emphasized that once the highest bid is accepted and the purchaser complies with all terms (including full payment), the bank cannot arbitrarily cancel the sale without providing a valid reason or opportunity to the purchaser to defend their rights. The Bench directed IDBI Bank to issue the sale certificate and execute the conveyance deed in favor of the respondent (auction purchaser), affirming that such cancellations undermine the integrity of auction processes and harm the interests of bona fide purchasers.
The case arose from IDBI Bank’s cancellation of an e-auction sale of mortgaged property despite the respondent depositing the entire bid amount of ₹4.51 crores. The Bank claimed the cancellation was due to pending litigation, but the Court found no evidence linking the litigation to the auctioned property. The judgment reinforces the necessity for financial institutions to adhere to procedural fairness in auction sales and validates the rights of purchasers who fulfill their obligations.
30.P. Pappu v. Inspector General of Registration
W.A.No.1160 of 2024, IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS, decided by Hon’ble JUSTICE R. SUBRAMANIAN & HON’BLE JUSTICE R.SAKTHIVEL, dated 27.09.2024.
The Madras High Court ruled that Sub Registrars cannot refuse to register a property transfer document merely because the original parent document or a non-traceability certificate from the police is not produced, especially where the parent document is lost. The Court emphasized that certified copies of the parent document issued by the registration office are sufficient, and the Sub Registrar can verify their authenticity against official records. The Court held that insisting on original documents or non-traceability certificates in all cases is unnecessary and may encourage underhand dealings. It further noted that the right to hold and deal with property is a constitutional right under Article 300A, and registration procedures must not impose unreasonable barriers. The Court set aside the refusal check slip issued by the Sub Registrar and directed registration of the release deed executed by the petitioner in favor of her brother, observing that the parties were relatives and had produced certified copies of antecedent documents registered in the same office.
The case arose when the Sub Registrar refused to register a release deed transferring property rights within a family on the ground of non-production of original antecedent title deeds. The petitioner produced certified copies of those documents, but registration was denied relying on Rule 55A(i) of the Tamil Nadu Registration Rules. The High Court found that Rule 55A and related provisions exceed the authority granted under the Registration Act, 1908, and cannot override the statutory right to register documents where certified copies are available and genuine. This judgment is significant for property law and registration practices in Tamil Nadu, as it facilitates smoother property transfers by removing onerous requirements that hinder registration, protects constitutional property rights, and curbs potential misuse of procedural formalities to delay or deny lawful transactions.
31. Sambit Samal vs State of Odisha
Sambit Samal v. State of Odisha, CRLMC No. 2078 of 2024, In the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, decided by Hon’ble Justice Sibo Sankar Mishra, dated 29.10.2024
The Orissa High Court dismissed the petition seeking quashing of an FIR against advocate Sambit Samal, who was accused of demanding ₹16.35 lakh, gold ornaments, original land deeds, and mobile phones from a litigant under the pretext of influencing a judge to secure bail for her husband in a case under the Odisha Protection of Interests of Depositors (OPID) Act. The Court held that the allegations, which implicated a former judge of the High Court and included detailed evidence such as bank transfers, chat records, and photographs, were too serious to be quashed at the investigative stage. The Bench emphasized that such conduct by an advocate was “unbecoming of the legal profession” and directed the Bar Council of Odisha to initiate disciplinary proceedings. Additionally, the petitioner was ordered to pay ₹10,000 as costs to the District Legal Services Authority, Cuttack.
The case underscores the judiciary’s zero tolerance for ethical breaches by legal professionals. The allegations involved exploiting a litigant’s vulnerability by promising judicial favors, thereby undermining public trust in the legal system. The Court’s refusal to quash the FIR reinforces the need for rigorous investigation into misconduct that tarnishes judicial integrity. By mandating disciplinary action by the Bar Council, the judgment highlights the dual accountability of advocates to both legal and professional standards.
32.Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India V. Delhi International Airport Ltd. & Ors.
Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India v. Delhi International Airport Ltd. & Ors., 2024 INSC 791, Supreme Court of India, decided by Hon’ble Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Hon’ble Justice J.B. Pardiwala, & Hon’ble justice Manoj Misra, dated 18.10.2024.
The Supreme Court held that the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority (AERA) has the right to file appeals against orders of the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) under Section 31 of the AERA Act, 2008, even when AERA is not a party to the original dispute. The Court clarified that AERA, as a statutory regulator, acts in the public interest when determining tariffs for aeronautical services and has a vested interest in ensuring compliance with its regulatory mandate. The Bench distinguished between AERA’s adjudicatory functions (where it cannot appeal) and its regulatory functions (where it can), emphasizing that tariff determination under Section 13(1)(a) of the AERA Act is a regulatory duty, not merely adjudicatory. The Court rejected the argument that AERA, being a quasi-judicial body, is barred from appealing TDSAT’s orders, stating that its role as a regulator safeguarding public interest justifies its right to challenge decisions undermining its statutory authority.
The case arose from TDSAT’s ruling that AERA lacked jurisdiction to impose tariffs on Ground Handling Services (GHS) and Cargo Handling Services (CHS) at airports, deeming them “non-aeronautical” under concession agreements like the OMDA. AERA contested this, arguing that such services fall within its regulatory purview under the AERA Act. The Supreme Court’s decision reaffirms AERA’s authority to regulate tariffs for services critical to airport operations, ensuring economic viability while balancing public interest.
33.Surinder Singh V. Ram DevSurinder Singh v. Ram Dev, 2024 SCC OnLine P&H 12999, Punjab and Haryana High Court, decided by Hon’ble Justice Manjari Nehru Kaul, dated 15.10.2024.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that a bribe amount cannot be enforced under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, as it constitutes an illegal and immoral transaction and does not qualify as a “legally enforceable debt or liability” under Section 138 of the Act. The Court emphasized that for a cheque dishonour to attract criminal liability, the instrument must be issued to discharge a lawful debt. Since bribes are inherently unlawful, cheques issued for such purposes fall outside the scope of Section 138.
The Bench upheld the trial court’s acquittal of the accused, noting that the complainant admitted during cross-examination that the ₹1 lakh cheque was issued to repay a bribe paid to secure jobs in the Punjab Police, rendering the transaction void ab initio. The case arose from a complaint alleging that the accused, in collusion with others, defrauded the complainant by accepting ₹12 lakh as a bribe for fake job assurances. When the accused issued a cheque to settle the bribe amount, it was dishonoured due to a closed account. The High Court reaffirmed that agreements rooted in illegality (here, corruption under the Prevention of Corruption Act) cannot create legally enforceable obligations, aligning with the principle ex turpi causa non oritur actio (no action arises from a wrongful act).
34.Ankur Agarwal V. State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home U.P. Lko. And Others
Ankur Agarwal v. State of U.P., Criminal Misc. Writ petition no. 8075 of 2023, In the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, decided by Hon’ble Justice Subhash Vidyarthi, Neutral Citation: 2024: AHC-LKO:70686, dated 23.10.2024.
The Allahabad High Court allowed the anticipatory bail application, holding that there is no absolute prohibition against considering such applications even after the issuance of a warrant of arrest or a proclamation under Section 82 CrPC. The Court emphasized that courts retain discretionary power to grant anticipatory bail in exceptional cases to serve the interests of justice. It relied on Supreme Court precedents (Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar, 2024) to affirm that while issuance of warrants under Section 82 CrPC generally bars anticipatory bail, courts can still evaluate the merits of the case in extreme circumstances. The Bench noted the absence of specific allegations against the applicant in the FIR and the lack of evidence linking him to the alleged forgery of land sale agreements.
The case arose from an FIR alleging forgery and conspiracy involving the sale of government land. The applicant, Ankur Agarwal, was accused of entering into an agreement to purchase part of the disputed land. The Sessions Court initially rejected his anticipatory bail, but the High Court intervened, observing that the allegations lacked concrete evidence and that the applicant’s role was peripheral.
35.HDFC Bank Ltd. Vs. The State of Bihar and Ors.
HDFC Bank Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 4324 of 2024 (Arising out of SLP (Cr.) No. 8906 of 2022), Supreme Court of India, decided by Hon’ble Justice B.R. Gavai and Hon’ble Justice K.V. Viswanathan, dated 22.10.2024.
The Supreme Court quashed an FIR against HDFC Bank and its officials, ruling that no mens rea (criminal intent) could be attributed to the bank, a juristic entity, for allegedly violating an Income Tax Department order under Section 132(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court held that the bank officials acted under a bona fide misunderstanding of the IT Department’s revocation order, which lifted restrictions on bank accounts but not on lockers. The Bench emphasized that offences under Sections 406 (criminal breach of trust), 409 (breach of trust by a banker), and 420 (cheating) of the IPC require proof of dishonest intent or fraudulent inducement, which were absent. The Court also noted that charges under Sections 34 (common intention), 120B (criminal conspiracy), and 462 (theft in a dwelling house) were unsustainable, as the FIR did not disclose collusion or unlawful gain.
The case arose from an IT Department restraint order during a search operation against an account holder, Smt. Sunita Khemka. HDFC Bank allowed her to access her locker after misinterpreting a subsequent email that revoked restrictions on accounts but not lockers. The Court applied the principles from State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992) to quash the FIR, stating that allegations, even if uncontroverted, failed to establish a prima facie case. This judgment reinforces that juristic entities like banks cannot be prosecuted without evidence of criminal intent and clarifies that procedural misunderstandings, absent malice, do not warrant criminal liability.
36.Amitabh Roy V. Master Development Management (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Another
Amitabh Roy v. Master Development Management (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Another, 2022 SCC OnLine NCLAT 240, National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, decided by Hon’ble Justice Ashok Bhushan (Chairperson), Hon’ble Shreesha Merla (Technical Member), and Hon’ble Naresh Salecha (Technical Member), dated 18.05.2022.
The NCLAT held that non-payment of TDS does not constitute a “default” under the IBC, and initiating CIRP under Section 9 for such dues is a misuse of the IBC. The Tribunal emphasized that TDS-related disputes fall exclusively under the Income Tax Act, 1961, and only tax authorities have the jurisdiction to address such defaults. The NCLAT set aside the NCLT’s order admitting the Section 9 application and imposed a cost of ₹1 lakh on the Operational Creditor for abusing the IBC process.
The case arose from a Section 9 application filed by Master Development Management (India) Pvt. Ltd. against Team Taurus Realty & Infrastructure (Corporate Debtor) over unpaid dues of ₹9.48 lakh, which included TDS amounts. After a settlement agreement in 2019, the Corporate Debtor paid the dues but allegedly defaulted on TDS payments of ₹66,884 and ₹1.10 lakh. The Operational Creditor sought revival of the insolvency petition, which the NCLT admitted. The NCLAT overturned this, ruling that the IBC cannot be used to recover TDS dues, as such matters are outside its purview. The Tribunal noted that the settlement had already been fulfilled, and the revival application was an abuse of process. This judgment reinforces the limited scope of the IBC and prevents its misuse for recovering statutory dues governed by other laws.
37.Bir Singh Vs. Delhi Jal Board and Ors.
Bir Singh v. Delhi Jal Board & Ors., 2018 INSC 763, (2018) 10 SCC 312, Supreme Court of India, decided by Hon’ble justice Ranjan Gogoi, Hon’ble justice N.V. Ramana, Hon’ble justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, Hon’ble justice S. Abdul Nazeer, Hon’ble justice R. Banumathi, dated 30.08.2018.
The Supreme Court held that migrants belonging to Scheduled Castes (SCs) or Scheduled Tribes (STs) cannot claim reservation benefits in a new state/Union Territory (UT) unless their caste/tribe is notified in the Presidential Order under Articles 341/342 of the Constitution for that state/UT. The Bench clarified that the Presidential Order specifying SCs/STs is state/UT-specific, and the “Pan-India Reservation” principle does not apply except in the National Capital Territory of Delhi, owing to its unique status as the capital. The Court emphasized that reservation benefits under Article 16(4) must align with the Presidential List for the respective state/UT, and no unilateral extension of such benefits by states/UTs is permissible.
The case arose from a dispute over reservation benefits claimed by a migrant SC employee in Delhi. The Constitution Bench overruled conflicting precedents and affirmed that the Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao principle (1990) applies: SC/ST status is confined to the state/UT of origin unless recognized in the destination state/UT’s Presidential List. This judgment reinforces the constitutional framework under Articles 341/342, ensuring reservation policies remain territorially specific and prevent misuse.
39.Ms Cp Rama Rao Sole Proprietor Vs. National Highways Authority Of India
Ms. CP Rama Rao Sole Proprietor v. National Highways Authority of India, W.P.(C) 11484/2023, In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Hon’ble Ms. Justice Tara Vitasta Ganju, dated 14.05.2024.
The Delhi High Court held that a Commercial Court cannot dismiss a Section 34 petition (challenging an arbitral award) under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, merely because the petitioner failed to challenge the dismissal of an earlier application under Section 9 (interim relief). The Court clarified that Section 34 proceedings are independent of Section 9 proceedings, and the dismissal of a Section 9 application does not preclude a party from contesting the arbitral award of merits. The Bench emphasized that the grounds for challenging an award under Section 34 are distinct from interim relief claims, and the doctrine of res judicata does not apply in such cases. The High Court set aside the Commercial Court’s order and remanded the matter for fresh consideration of its merits.
39.Deepak Takhar v. State of Rajasthan
Deepak Takhar v. State of Rajasthan , Cri Appeal No. __ / 2024 @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.11796/2024, IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, decided by Hon’ble justice ABHAY S.OKA and Hon’ble justice AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, dated 25.10.2024.
Link:https://www.barandbench.com/news/wrong-to-deny-bail-only-because-murder-case-supreme-court
The Supreme Court held that denying bail solely because the case involves a murder charge is erroneous and violates the principles of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Bench emphasized that bail decisions must consider factors such as the role of the accused, prima facie evidence, duration of custody, and likelihood of trial completion, rather than mechanically rejecting bail based on the seriousness of the offense. The Court reiterated that bail is a rule and jail an exception, and prolonged incarceration without trial undermines the presumption of innocence. It directed the Trial Court to reconsider the bail application of the appellant, who had been in custody for over two years, while ensuring the appellant complies with conditions to avoid witness tampering.
The case arose from the appellant’s arrest in a murder case under Sections 302, 34, and 120B of the IPC. The Rajasthan High Court had denied bail, citing the gravity of the offense. The Supreme Court’s judgment underscores the need for courts to balance the seriousness of allegations with individual rights, particularly in cases of extended pre-trial detention. This ruling is significant for bail jurisprudence, as it curbs the tendency to equate serious charges with automatic denial of bail and reinforces the judiciary’s duty to safeguard liberty while ensuring trial integrity.
40.Muthuvelaydha Perumal Appavu Vs. R.M. Babu Murugavel
Muthuvelaydha Perumal Appavu v. R.M. Babu Murugavel, Crl. O.P. No. 25334 of 2024, Crl. M.P. Nos. 14210 and 14212 of 2024, In the High Court of Madras, decided by Hon’ble Dr. Justice G. Jayachandran, dated 25.10.2024.
The Madras High Court quashed a criminal defamation complaint against Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Speaker M. Appavu, ruling that the complainant, R.M. Babu Murugavel, lacked locus standi as he was neither an aggrieved party nor authorized by the AIADMK to represent the party. The Court held that Murugavel’s complaint, filed in his personal capacity, did not satisfy the requirement of “some person aggrieved” under Section 199(2) of the CrPC, as the alleged defamatory statements targeted 40 AIADMK MLAs in 2017—a period when Murugavel was not even a party member. Additionally, the Court clarified that the IPC provisions (Sections 499 and 500) applied to the case, even though the complaint was filed after 01.07.2024, as the offence occurred before the BNSS came into force, and the savings clause under Section 531(2)(a) of the BNSS preserved the applicability of repealed laws for pre-July 2024 incidents.
The case arose from a 2023 speech by Appavu at a book release event, where he claimed 40 AIADMK MLAs were willing to defect to the DMK in 2017. Murugavel, a later entrant to the AIADMK, filed the complaint alleging defamation, but the Court noted that the party’s Organizing Secretary had dismissed the remarks as untrue without treating them as defamatory. The judgment underscores the necessity of authorization for representative complaints in defamation cases and clarifies the transitional application of penal laws post-BNSS. It reinforces that complaints under Section 499 IPC must be filed by directly aggrieved individuals or authorized representatives, preventing misuse by unrelated parties.
41.M/S Steel Rocks INC V/s M/S Bangalore Elevated
M/S Steel Rocks INC & Anr. v. M/S Bangalore Elevated Tollway Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., 2024 LiveLaw (Kar) 446, Criminal Petition No. 4877 of 2024, In the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, decided by Hon’ble Justice M. Nagaprasanna , dated 21.10.2024.
Link:https://www.barandbench.com/news/change-of-lawyer-not-ground-recall-witness-karnataka-high-court
The Karnataka High Court held that mere change of counsel cannot justify recalling a witness under Section 311 of the CrPC, especially when cross-examination was already conducted extensively. The Court emphasized that such applications must demonstrate new material evidence or prejudice caused by prior cross-examination, neither of which were present in this case. The Bench rejected the petitioners’ argument that their previous counsel’s death necessitated recalling the witness, noting that the complainant (PW-1) had been cross-examined over multiple dates in 2019 and 2021, and the trial was at the judgment stage after seven years. Relying on Supreme Court precedents (Varsha Garg v. State of Haryana), the Court underscored that procedural delays undermine the rights of victims and stressed the need for expeditious trials in cheque bounce cases under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
The case arose from a 2017 cheque bounce dispute involving ₹25 lakhs, where the petitioners sought to recall the complainant for further cross-examination after their previous counsel died. The High Court observed that the petitioners’ new counsel failed to identify specific gaps in prior cross-examination or new evidence warranting recall. The judgment reinforces that Section 311 CrPC cannot be misused to prolong trials and that litigants must adhere to procedural discipline.
42.Union of India V. OCL Iron and Steel Limited
Union of India v. OCL Iron and Steel Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine Del 7338, In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, decided by Hon’ble Chief Justice Manmohan and Hon’ble Justice Tushar Rao Gedela, dated 22.10.2024.
Link:https://www.barandbench.com/news/surprise-claim-resolution-plan-approval-ibc-delhi-high-court
The Delhi High Court dismissed the Union of India’s appeal, upholding the “clean slate” principle under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, which extinguishes all pre-resolution plan liabilities not explicitly included in the approved plan. The Court ruled that the (NCLT)-approved resolution plan for OCL Iron and Steel Ltd. barred the Union of India from disqualifying the company from coal mine auctions based on past dues related to a Performance Bank Guarantee (PBG) of ₹92.25 crore. The Bench emphasized that the Union of India’s failure to resubmit its claim during the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) rendered the claim extinguished, and post-resolution plan approval, no stakeholder can impose penalties or revive such claims.
The case arose from the Union of India’s attempt to disqualify OCL from participating in coal mine auctions due to non-renewal of the PBG, despite the NCLT approving its resolution plan in 2023. The High Court reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s precedent in Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. (2021), stressing that the IBC mandates a fresh start for resolved entities, free from legacy liabilities. This judgment reinforces the binding nature of resolution plans on all stakeholders, including government authorities, and prevents the misuse of extinguished claims to hinder a corporate debtor’s revival.
43.Punjab National Bank V. Manoj Kumar
Punjab National Bank v. Manoj Kumar, W.P.(C) 4770/2007 & CM APPL. 13972/2017, In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, decided by Hon’ble Justice Chandra Dhari Singh, dated 16.10.2024.
Link:https://www.barandbench.com/news/reinstatement-back-wages-not-automatic-delhi-high-court
The Delhi High Court held that reinstatement and back wages are not automatic upon setting aside a disciplinary action, especially where the disciplinary proceedings are found to be procedurally flawed but the employee’s conduct is not entirely blameless or the charges are not wholly disproven. The Court emphasized that the grant of back wages and reinstatement is a discretionary relief and must be decided based on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Bench noted that while the employee’s termination was set aside due to procedural irregularities, the Court has the authority to deny back wages and reinstatement if it finds that the employee’s conduct was not above board or if there was some element of misconduct, even if not proved in strict disciplinary proceedings. The judgment reinforces the principle that the remedy for wrongful termination is not always full reinstatement with back wages and that courts must balance the interests of both the employer and the employee.
The case arose from a challenge by the bank against an award by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, which had directed reinstatement with full back wages to the employee. The High Court partially set aside the award, granting reinstatement but denying back wages, considering the overall conduct of the employee and the fact that the charges were not completely disproven. This judgment is significant for employment law, as it clarifies that reinstatement and back wages are not automatic entitlements and must be adjudicated based on the merits of each case, ensuring fairness to both parties in employment disputes.
MRB Nurses Empowerment Association v. Principal Secretary
MRB Nurses Empowerment Association v. Principal Secretary, 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 5801, In the High Court of Madras, decided by Hon’ble Chief justice K.R. Shriram and Hon’ble justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy, dated 18.10.2024.
The Madras High Court held that the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 prevails over any contractual conditions, and contractually engaged employees are entitled to maternity benefits under the Act. The Court ruled that contractual employees, including nurses engaged through the Medical Services Recruitment Board (MRB), are “employees” under Section 3(o) of the Act and thus eligible for maternity leave and benefits. The Bench emphasized that the Act is a special welfare legislation intended to protect women in employment, and its provisions cannot be circumvented by contractual stipulations or by labeling employees as “contractual” or “temporary.” The Court directed the State Government to grant maternity benefits to all contractual nurses who have completed the statutory eligibility period, and to issue necessary instructions for compliance across all government hospitals in Tamil Nadu.
The case arose from the denial of maternity leave and benefits to contractual nurses, despite their continuous service and fulfillment of eligibility criteria under the Act. The petitioners challenged the State’s refusal, arguing that their engagement through the MRB did not deprive them of statutory rights. The High Court’s judgment affirms the supremacy of the Maternity Benefit Act over contractual terms and clarifies that the Act’s protections extend to all women employees, regardless of their mode of engagement. This ruling is significant for labor law and gender equity, as it ensures that contractual employees are not denied statutory maternity benefits and reinforces the State’s obligation to uphold the rights of women workers.
45.Challani Rank Jewellery and Others V. Ashok Kumar Jain
Challani Rank Jewellery and Ors. V. Ashok Kumar Jain, Crl. O.P. No. 21268 of 2024 and Crl. M.P. Nos. 12190 and 12191 of 2024, IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS, decided by justice G. Jayachandran, dated 17.10.2024.
The Madras High Court held that a single complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments (NI) Act, 1881, is maintainable for multiple cheques when they are issued as part of a single transaction. The Court clarified that where several cheques are issued to discharge a single liability or as part of the same agreement, consolidating the dishonour of all cheques into one complaint is legally permissible. The Bench relied on Supreme Court precedents, including Sunil Todi v. State of Gujarat (2021), which recognized that multiple cheques issued for a single transaction can be the subject of a single complaint. The Court dismissed the petitioners’ contention that a separate complaint was required for each dishonoured cheque, emphasizing that the intent behind the NI Act is to facilitate expeditious and practical resolution of cheque dishonour cases, not to burden complainants with procedural multiplicity.
The case arose from a business transaction in which the accused issued multiple cheques to the complainant as part of the same deal, all of which were subsequently dishonoured. The petitioner sought to quash the complaint on the ground that only one complaint per cheque is allowed under the NI Act. The High Court’s judgment clarifies the law on this issue, ensuring that complainants are not penalized for procedural technicalities when multiple cheques are issued for a single liability. This ruling is significant for commercial transactions and cheque dishonour litigation, as it streamlines the legal process and prevents unnecessary duplication of complaints for related cheques issued under the same transaction
46.Rampat Lal Verma v. Rahul Verma
Rampat Lal Verma v. Rahul Verma, 2024 SCC OnLine Gau 1637, In the High Court of Gauhati, decided by Hon’ble Justice Robin Phukan, dated 22.10.2024.
The Gauhati High Court held that if a dispute is arbitrable and an arbitration clause exists in the agreement between the parties, courts are bound to refer the dispute to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court emphasized that where the subject matter of the dispute is covered by the arbitration clause, judicial intervention at the initial stage is limited, and the dispute must be referred to arbitration as mandated by the statute. The Bench observed that the intention of the legislature is to minimize court interference and promote arbitration as the primary mechanism for dispute resolution in commercial matters.
The case arose from a dispute involving a partnership firm, where one party sought to invoke the arbitration clause after the other party filed a civil suit. The High Court ruled that since the dispute was covered by the arbitration clause and was arbitrable, the civil court was obligated to refer the matter to arbitration. This judgment reinforces the principle of judicial deference to arbitration agreements and underscores the importance of upholding party autonomy in commercial contracts. It is significant for arbitration practice, as it clarifies the mandatory nature of Section 8 and ensures that disputes covered by arbitration clauses are resolved through arbitration, not litigation.
47. VTP Technologies Private Limited. V. Contrivers Technologies Private Limited and Others.
VTP Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Contrivers Technologies Pvt. Ltd. and Ors., C.P. No. 53/BB/2024, National Company Law Tribunal, Bengaluru Bench, decided by Hon’ble justice K. Biswal (Judicial) and Hon’ble Manoj Kumar Dubey (Technical), dated 28.10.2024.
The NCLT, Bengaluru Bench, admitted the Section 7 Insolvency Application filed by VTP Technologies (Financial Creditor) against Contrivers Technologies (Corporate Debtor), ruling that the debt was not time-barred due to acknowledgment in balance sheets under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Tribunal held that the Corporate Debtor’s balance sheets for FY 2018–2019 to 2022–2023 explicitly acknowledged the debt, thereby extending the limitation period. The Bench rejected the Corporate Debtor’s defense that the debt was time-barred, emphasizing that entries in balance sheets constitute a valid acknowledgment under law. The Tribunal also noted that the corporate guarantee provided by the Corporate Debtor’s directors was enforceable, as the creditors had not waived their rights under the guarantee.
The case arose from a default on a ₹5.5 crore loan advanced to Contrivers Technologies under a Loan Agreement with directors providing personal guarantees. Despite repeated demands, the debt remained unpaid. The NCLT’s decision underscores the significance of balance sheet entries as evidence of debt acknowledgment, preventing debtors from evading liability through technical limitations. This judgment is critical for insolvency proceedings, as it reinforces the binding nature of financial disclosures in statutory records and ensures that creditors can rely on such acknowledgments to revive time-barred claims.
48.Mohammed Saifullah V. Reserve Bank of India
Mohammed Saifullah v. Reserve Bank of India, W.P. No. 25631 of 2024, In the High Court of Judicature at Madras, decided by Hon’ble Justice G. Jayachandran, dated 10.09.2024.
The Madras High Court ruled that the police cannot freeze a bank account without specifying the amount allegedly involved in a financial fraud and without providing a reasonable opportunity for the account holder to be heard. The Court emphasized that freezing an account is a drastic measure that can severely affect an individual’s livelihood and rights, and therefore, authorities must strictly adhere to due process. The judgment clarified that freezing orders must be supported by clear quantification of the suspected fraudulent amount, and the account holder must be given a chance to respond before such action is taken.
The case arose from a situation where the petitioner’s bank account was frozen by the police in connection with an alleged financial fraud investigation, but the authorities failed to specify the amount involved or give the petitioner an opportunity to present his case. The High Court set aside the freezing order, directing the authorities to follow proper procedure and ensure that the rights of individuals are respected during investigations.
49.N.Thajudeen V. Tamil Nadu Khadi And Village Industries
Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, 2024 INSC 817, Supreme Court of India, decided by Hon’ble Justice Pankaj Mithal and hon’ble justice Ujjal Bhuyan, dated 24.10.2024
The Supreme Court ruled that a gift deed, once validly accepted, cannot be revoked unilaterally unless the deed itself reserves such a right or unless specific legal contingencies under Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, are met. The Court emphasized that a donor cannot revoke a gift merely because the donee has not used the property for the intended purpose stated in the deed, unless the deed explicitly provides for revocation in such circumstances.
The Court found that the registered gift deed executed by the appellant in 1983 in favor of the Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board was absolute and contained no reservation of a right to revoke. The Board had accepted the gift and taken steps such as applying for mutation and commencing construction, which constituted valid acceptance and possession. The appellant had attempted to revoke the gift in 1987, alleging that the Board had not used the property for manufacturing Khadi products as intended. The Supreme Court held that such non-utilization was a breach of the gift’s object but did not entitle the donor to revoke the gift. The Court clarified that, under Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, a gift can only be revoked under three circumstances: if the parties agreed to a revocation upon a specified event; if the gift was revocable at the will of the donor (which is void if so agreed); or if the gift can be rescinded in a manner akin to rescinding a contract. None of these conditions were present in this case.
The Supreme Court also addressed the issue of limitation, holding that the suit for declaration and possession was filed within the 12-year period prescribed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as the cause of action was based on possession rather than mere declaration of title. In its judgment, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upheld the validity of the gift deed, and declared the appellant’s revocation deed void ab initio.
