Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) Legal Services for Businesses and Creditors

1. Adani Enterprises Ltd. v. Paranjoy Guha Thakurta & Ors.

 Citation: CS (SCJ) No. 1066/2025; Delhi High Court, Rohini Courts (Anuj Kumar Singh SCJ-cum-RC); Dated: 06.09.2025​

 Ratio: The Delhi High Court granted ex parte ad interim injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 2 CPC restraining defendants journalists activists John Does from publishing distributing circulating unverified unsubstantiated ex facie defamatory material against plaintiff Adani Enterprises while directing removal of specified defamatory content from websites social media within days per IT Intermediary Rules 2021. Further the plaintiff has also sought removal of such defamatory material by defendants no 1 to 10 vide prayer clause A of the application. To the extent that the articles and posts are incorrect and unverified and prima facie defamatory defendants no 1 to 10 are also directed to expunge such defamatory material from their respective articlessocial media poststweets and if the same is not feasible remove the same within 5 days from date of this order. Liberty granted to notify intermediaries for takedown of hyperlinks within 36 hours subject to 180 day preservation clarifying no restraint on fair accurate reporting of investigations court proceedings based on verified facts balance convenience favouring plaintiff irreparable reputational harm.

2. Anil Khandelwal etc. v. Phoenix India & Anr.

 Citation: Criminal Appeal Nos. 1159-1160 of 2011 (with 1166/2011); Supreme Court of India (Sanjay Karol & Sandeep Mehta JJ.); 2025 INSC 1069; Dated: 28.08.2025​

 Ratio: Supreme Court of India held that company officers cannot be held vicariously liable under Sections 499, 500, and 501 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) without impleading the company itself as accused. The Court ruled there is no provision in the IPC attaching vicarious liability to Managing Directors or Directors when the company is the accused, unlike special statutes such as the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 or Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 which explicitly create such liability. Prosecution under IPC requires the company to be arraigned as accused under principles from Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels (2012 5 SCC 661), with specific material showing the officer’s precise role, active participation, authorization, or deliberate omission, as mere designation is insufficient. Officers also enjoy protection under Section 32 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) for good faith actions like issuing possession notices under Section 13(4) despite clerical errors. In conclusion, the criminal proceedings for defamation based on a clerical error in a SARFAESI possession notice were quashed as untenable, affirming no automatic vicarious liability under IPC.

3.M/s Interstate Construction v. National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd.

 Citation: Civil Appeal No. 3461 of 2025; Supreme Court of India (Abhay S. Oka & Ujjwal Bhuyan JJ.); 2025 INSC 699; Dated: 15.05.2025​

 Ratio: Supreme Court of India held that arbitral tribunals have wide discretion under Section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to award interest, including pre-reference, pendente lite, and post-award interest at reasonable rates on principal sums, reaffirming the pro-arbitration approach. The Court clarified that Section 31(7)(a) empowers tribunals to grant interest at such rate as deemed reasonable for the whole or part of the period from cause of action to award date, allowing sub-division into pre-reference (e.g., 18% p.a.) and pendente lite periods (e.g., 12% p.a.), excluding laches periods, without parties’ agreement barring it. It ruled that the “sum directed to be paid” under Section 31(7)(b) includes principal plus pre-award interest, attracting further post-award interest (originally 18% p.a., now 2% above current rate), permitting interest on interest as clarified in Hyder Consulting (2015 2 SCC 189) overruling S.L. Arora (2010 3 SCC 690). Courts under Sections 34 and 37 cannot interfere unless awards are perverse, exorbitant, or patently illegal, as minimal judicial intervention promotes arbitration efficacy. In conclusion, the High Court order setting aside interest directions was reversed, upholding the tribunal’s award of compounded interest structure as lawful and reasonable.

4.Kaveri Plastics v Mahdoom Bawa Bahrudeen Noorul

 Citation: Criminal Appeal Nos of 2025 (from SLP Crl 11184 11185 2024), Supreme Court of India, BR Gavai CJI and NV Anjaria J, 2025 INSC 1133, 19 September 2025

 Ratio: Supreme Court of India held that a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) is not maintainable if the demand notice under Proviso (b) to Section 138 does not mention the exact cheque amount, rendering the notice invalid. The Court ruled that “said amount of money” in Proviso (b) strictly refers to the cheque amount as per the phrase “any amount of money” in the main Section 138, requiring precise demand for that sum within 30 days of dishonour notice, with failure to pay within 15 days completing the offence alongside Proviso (a) and (c). It clarified that notices demanding different amounts (e.g., Rs.2 crores vs. Rs.1 crore cheque) fail despite correct cheque details like number, date, and bank, as additional claims (interest, costs) are severable only if cheque amount is specified first, following Suman Sethi v. Ajay K. Churiwal (2000 2 SCC 380) and Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel v. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel (2023 1 SCC 578). Typographical errors or inadvertence claims (e.g., recurring in multiple notices) cannot be excused, as penal provisions demand strict literal compliance without elasticity or reading notices holistically to cure defects. In conclusion, the High Court correctly quashed the complaint due to invalid notice demanding double the cheque amount, upholding technical precision to protect honest drawers while advancing NI Act’s business facilitation object.

5. Mrs Shailja Krishna v Satori Global Limited & Ors

 Citation: Civil Appeal Nos 6377 6378 of 2023, Supreme Court of India (Dipankar Datta & K Vinod Chandran JJ), 2025 INSC 1065, Dated 02 September 2025​

 Ratio: Supreme Court of India held that the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) possesses wide jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956 (corresponding to Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013) to examine allegations of fraud in oppression and mismanagement petitions, including validity of gift deeds, share transfers, and board resolutions. The Court ruled that NCLT, as a quasi-judicial original authority, can adjudicate incidental issues like fraud, coercion, forgery, and AoA violations (e.g., Clause 16 restricting gifts to specified relatives, excluding mother-in-law) without relegating to civil courts under Specific Relief Act, 1963, provided they are integral to ending oppression prejudicial to members or public interest. It affirmed NCLT’s power to set aside invalid board meetings lacking notice (AoA Clauses 30, 61; Section 286, 1956 Act) or quorum (AoA Clause 53), expired share transfer forms (Section 108(1A), 1956 Act), manipulated documents, and fabricated resignations, as serial illegal acts lacking probity constitute oppression per Shanti Prasad Jain v. Kalinga Tubes Ltd. and Needle Industries (India) Ltd. v. Needle Industries Newey (India) Holding Ltd.. NCLT maintains liberal locus standi under Section 399 for members alleging mismanagement, reinstating directors and rectifying registers (Section 111A) to protect minority shareholders from mala fide ousters. In conclusion, NCLAT erred in denying NCLT jurisdiction over fraud; NCLT’s order declaring gift deed/share transfer invalid, restoring appellant’s 98.75% shares and directorship, was upheld as it remedied oppressive conduct without elongating disputes.

 6.P. Francis v C.P. Joseph & Others

 Citation: Civil Appeal No of 2025 (from SLP C No 13348 of 2025), Supreme Court of India (Amanullah J & SVN Bhatti J), 2025 INSC 1071, 03 September 2025​

 Ratio: Supreme Court of India summarized key principles governing Section 100 read with Section 100(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) for second appeals, emphasizing that High Courts exercise exceptional discretionary jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 100(5) only for strong, convincing reasons recorded in judgment. The Court held that substantial questions of law must arise from pleadings, issues, and lower courts’ findings, going to the case’s root, and cannot introduce entirely new cases (e.g., applying Section 67, Indian Succession Act, 1925 without pleaded relationship of attesting witness to beneficiary) altering trial burden or requiring unmet suggestions in cross-examination per Browne v. Dunn rule. It ruled that framing additional questions demands prior admission on at least one substantial question, fair notice to respondents for arguments, and mandatory reasons; absent these, it exceeds jurisdiction, as routine exercise undermines concurrent factual findings on will validity under Section 63, Succession Act. High Courts cannot re-appraise evidence or grant new reliefs absent perversity, warranting interference only in exceptional cases via Article 136. In conclusion, the Kerala High Court erred in framing and deciding an additional unpleaded question voiding a proved joint will solely on attestor-beneficiary link without reasons or opportunity, warranting reversal and upholding trial/appellate decrees favoring testamentary succession with enhanced legatee compensation.

7.Sanjabij Tari v Kishore S Borcar & Anr

 Case Name: Sanjabij Tari v Kishore S Borcar and Another​

Citation: Criminal Appeal No 1755 of 2010, Supreme Court of India Manmohan and NV Anjaria JJ, 2025 INSC 1158, 25 September 2025​

 Ratio: The Supreme Court held that upon admission of cheque execution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, rebuttable presumptions arise under Sections 118 and 139 that the cheque was drawn for consideration and received in discharge of a legally enforceable debt, placing initial onus on the accused to rebut through cogent evidence of complainant’s financial incapacity, which the respondent failed to lead despite cross-examination opportunities, rendering High Court’s re-appreciation of evidence and acceptance of improbable blank cheque defence unsustainable in revisional jurisdiction absent perversity. The Court further held that violation of Section 269SS of the Income Tax Act, 1961, attracts only penalty under Section 271D without voiding the transaction or rebutting NI Act presumptions, expressly overruling P.C. Hari v. Shine Varghese (2025 SCC OnLine Ker 5535); non-reply to statutory notice strengthens liability inference per established precedents; Section 138 offence, being quasi-criminal and compoundable, permits voluntary compromise to terminate proceedings and Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 benefits, overruling M.V. Nalinakshan v. M. Rameshan (2009 All MR Cri J 273). Amid massive pendency, binding guidelines were issued for dasti/e-summons service, pre-cognizance synopsis, waiver of Section 223 BNSS summons, early Section 143A interim compensation, revised compounding costs (0% pre-defence evidence, 5% post-defence pre-judgment, 7.5% appellate, 10% Supreme Court), physical hearings post-summons, realistic evening court pecuniary limits, pendency dashboards, and monitoring committees operational by November 1, 2025; appeal allowed, High Court acquittal set aside, trial/sessions conviction restored with direction for accused payment of Rs.7,50,000 in 15 monthly Rs.50,000 instalments.

 8. Case Name: Sanjay D Jain and Others v State of Maharashtra and Others

 Citation: Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP Crl No 12584 of 2024, Supreme Court of India BR Gavai CJI KV Chandran and Atul S Chandurkar JJ, 2025 INSC 1168, 26 September 2025​

 Ratio: The Supreme Court ruled that courts can dismiss police complaints under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when vague family accusations of dowry gift demands after marriage fail to prove specific cruelty or harassment required under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code against in-laws, and claims of unnatural sex under Section 377 or threats under Section 506 with common intention under Section 34 only target the husband, making trial against other relatives an abuse of court process following State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Digambar v. State of Maharashtra, holding that FIR No.20 of 2022 at Bajaj Nagar Police Station Nagpur lacked details of intentional grave harm or suicide risk against appellants (father-in-law, mother-in-law, sister-in-law) with only general statements like one call for clothes and jewellery while Section 377 and Section 506 allegations pointed solely to the husband, thus quashing proceedings against them as no prima facie case existed, emphasizing key principles that “If the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even when taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out any case against the accused, quashing of the proceedings would be justified. Vague and general allegations cannot lead to forming of a prima facie case” and “The cruelty caused by the husband and his family members should be of such nature that it is inflicted with the intention to cause grave injury or drive the victim to commit suicide or inflict grave injury to herself. Such allegations are absent in the present case,” highlighting protection of innocent relatives from vague matrimonial complaints by applying Bhajan Lal tests strictly at quashing stage where High Court overlooked lack of specifics against appellants and misread FIR, and allowed the appeal by quashing FIR No.20 of 2022 and final report under Section 173 CrPC against appellants under Sections 498A, 377, 506 read with Section 34 IPC while clarifying no impact on husband’s proceedings to be decided on merits.