1.     Kuntegowda v Thurubaiah

Citation: Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 765, SLP (Criminal) No. 2247 of 2024, decided on 04.08.2026 by the Supreme Court of India (B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.).

Ratio: The Supreme Court restored the conviction. It held that once the accused admits his signature on the cheque, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act arise in favour of the complainant, and the burden shifts to the accused to rebut them.

The Court further held that the initial burden of alleging that the complainant lacked financial capacity to advance the loan lies on the accused. Such a defense should ordinarily be specifically raised in the reply to the statutory notice. If the accused does not raise it, the complainant cannot subsequently be expected to prove his financial capacity on his own.

In the present case, the complainant’s financial capacity was supported by evidence that he had received financial assistance from relatives and friends and had also invested in chit funds. The accused failed to produce sufficient material to rebut this evidence.

The Supreme Court also held that the High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, could not re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own view for the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and Appellate Court unless there was perversity or serious miscarriage of justice.

The accused borrowed ₹4.5 lakh from the complainant and issued a cheque towards repayment. The cheque was dishonored due to insufficient funds. The Trial Court convicted the accused under Section 138 of the NI Act, and the Appellate Court affirmed the conviction. However, the Karnataka High Court acquitted the accused, mainly on the ground that the complainant had failed to establish his financial capacity to advance the loan.

The case is important in cheque-bounce cases because it clarifies that financial capacity is not something the complainant must prove automatically in every case. If the accused wants to rely on the complainant’s lack of financial capacity, that defense must be properly raised and supported by evidence. It also reinforces the limited scope of the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction.

2.     Khadi & Village Industries Commission (KVIC) v. Board of Trustees of Mumbai Khadi & Village Industries Association (MKVIA) & Ors.

Citation: Khadi & Village Industries Commission v. Board of Trustees of Mumbai Khadi & Village Industries Association & Ors. (07.08.2026 – High Court of Judicature at Bombay arising out of Interim Application No. 5867 of 2025 & Contempt Petition No. 13 of 2026 in Commercial IP Suit No. 580 of 2022; Decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan).

Ratio: The High Court of Bombay held that the jurisdiction under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) is essentially remedial and coercive rather than punitive, aimed primarily at securing compliance with interim injunction orders rather than imposing attachment of property or civil imprisonment as sanctions in themselves. The Court laid down a structured seven-point framework clarifying that while determining a violation under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC, the applicable standard of proof is the civil standard of preponderance of probabilities (albeit of a high degree commensurate with the gravity of alleged non-compliance), rather than the strict criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt applicable under extraordinary contempt jurisdiction. Where compliance with an interim order has been substantially achieved and the violative conduct has ceased, ordering civil imprisonment or attachment of property is unnecessary and impermissible.

The Court observed that proceedings for disobedience of an interim injunction cannot be treated as purely criminal proceedings to penalize an offender once the objective of securing compliance is fulfilled. The remedies of property attachment and civil imprisonment provided under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC are tools of last resort to be exercised with extreme caution. If compliance can be adequately ensured or restored through directions and remedial measures under Section 151 of the CPC, the Court should refrain from resorting to harsh coercive measures like civil detention or property attachment.

The High Court further emphasized that courts must carefully analyze the scope and intent of the restraining order to determine whether an alleged act constitutes a genuine violation. Restraint orders prohibiting the commercial use, advertisement, or promotion of trademarked goods or business names cannot be stretched to cover actions that bear no nexus to the restrained commercial activity, such as executing land sale contracts under a registered corporate identity or legacy third-party digital directory listings.

Applying these principles, the High Court found that the defendants had wilfully breached the interim injunction by hosting a 3-day trade fair (“Khadi Mahotsav 2.0”) on their premises using the protected mark and logo. However, since the defendants subsequently fell in line and ceased further non-compliant activities, the Court held that sending the trustees to civil prison or attaching property was not warranted. The Court instead invoked its inherent powers under Section 151 CPC to impose costs of ₹2,50,000 on the defendants, issued strict permanent restraint directions, and dismissed the separate contempt petition regarding the land transaction and digital listings.

This judgment is significant because it provides a comprehensive 7-point guide balancing the enforcement of interim injunctions with protection against disproportionate punitive measures. The decision serves as a key landmark clarifying the standard of proof and the non-punitive nature of Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC, ensuring that civil enforcement mechanisms are utilized strictly to secure compliance rather than as an instrument of retribution.

For intellectual property practitioners, civil litigants, and courts exercising interlocutory jurisdiction, the ruling offers clear guidance on enforcing interim orders. It reaffirms that while intentional disobedience of court orders will attract firm judicial intervention and cost sanctions, the ultimate goal of Order XXXIX Rule 2A remains the preservation of judicial authority through compliance rather than unnecessary incarceration or attachment.

3.     Kanwal Chaudhary v Birender Chaudhary

Citation: Kanwal Chaudhary v. Birender Chaudhary (07.05.2018 – High Court of Delhi; Decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.K. Gauba; Neutral Citation: 2018: DHC:2989).

Ratio: The High Court of Delhi held that proceedings initiated under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) cannot survive or be continued following the final disposal or dismissal of the main suit, as well as upon the death of the alleged contemnor. The Court clarified that an interim injunction order is temporary in character and merges into the final decree or order passed upon the termination of the civil suit. Once the suit itself comes to an end, the interlocutory directions cease to exist independently, rendering pending Rule 2A execution/contempt applications non-maintainable. Furthermore, because liability for alleged willful disobedience of an injunction is personal in nature, such enforcement proceedings cannot be continued against or visited upon the legal representatives of a deceased party.

The High Court observed that Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC is designed to enforce adherence to interim orders during the subsistence and pendency of a suit. The statutory mechanism of attachment of property or civil imprisonment is directed personally against the individual who committed the breach to compel obedience. Consequently, when the main suit is dismissed or finally disposed of, the underlying interim injunction ceases to operate, extinguishing the basis for compelling future compliance. Moreover, the principle of actio personalis moritur cum persona applies to coercive civil detention proceedings, making it impermissible to substitute legal heirs to penalize or enforce penal measures for alleged past non-compliance committed by the deceased.

The Court emphasized that courts exercising jurisdiction under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC must ensure that execution remedies are not converted into ongoing punitive actions after the lis itself has concluded. While courts retain inherent powers to address deliberate defiance during the pendency of a proceeding, interlocutory contempt enforcement cannot run parallel to or outlive the final determination of the primary civil suit.

Applying these legal principles, the High Court held that the continuation of Rule 2A proceedings against the legal heirs after the suit’s dismissal and the death of the original party was legally unsustainable. The Court set aside the impugned orders permitting substitution and continuation, ruling that the interim injunction merged into the final disposition and that substitution of legal representatives in Order XXXIX Rule 2A proceedings was legally impermissible.

This judgment is significant as it establishes clear procedural boundaries regarding the survivability of interlocutory enforcement applications under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC. It re-affirms the doctrine of merger of interim orders into final decrees and protects legal representatives from being subjected to personal coercive enforcement for the alleged interlocutory defaults of a deceased litigant.

For civil litigators and trial courts, the ruling provides vital guidance on the lifespan of interim contempt applications, ensuring that Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC is utilized strictly as a living enforcement mechanism during suit pendency rather than a surviving claim that outlasts the suit or the original party.

4.     Sunder Singh and Anr v M/s Satish Kumar Garg and Company and Ors.

Citation: Sunder Singh and Anr. v. M/s Satish Kumar Garg and Company and Ors. (29.07.2026 – Supreme Court of India; Decided by Hon’ble Supreme Court; Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 855).

Ratio: The Supreme Court held that lands officially earmarked for afforestation and ecological restoration under the Aravalli Project must be accorded the exact same protective status as existing plantations, regardless of whether saplings have already been planted on the ground. The Court clarified that environmental protection under statutory and policy frameworks cannot be made contingent upon the physical execution of planting activities, as the mere designation of land for ecological conservation creates a complete legal bar against non-forest activities, including mining. Granting environmental clearances or permitting mining operations on earmarked tracts simply due to an absence of current plantation defeats the prospective purpose of ecological restoration and violates sustainable development principles.

The Supreme Court observed that the Aravalli range plays a critical ecological role in preventing desertification and maintaining regional environmental balance, making strict judicial oversight necessary. The Court noted that state authorities and mining lessees cannot exploit administrative delays in planting saplings to reclassify earmarked conservation zones as commercially viable mining land. The legal framework governing afforestation projects demands that once a parcel of land is dedicated to the Aravalli Project, its prospective ecological character becomes non-negotiable, overriding commercial mining claims or subsisting lease rights.

The Court emphasized that environmental permissions granted in contravention of conservation project boundaries are void ab initio. It highlighted that public trust and the precautionary principle obligate both state regulatory authorities and trial/high courts to strictly scrutinize land use classifications before sanctioning industrial or extraction activities in ecologically sensitive regions.

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned High Court order that had permitted mining activities on the subject land on the flawed premise that no physical plantation currently existed. The Apex Court quashed all environmental clearances granted for the region, ordered the immediate termination of subsisting mining leases operating on the earmarked land, and directed the State Government to conduct a comprehensive survey to demarcate and permanently protect all such project parcels from future mining incursions.

This judgment is significant because it expands the scope of environmental jurisprudence from protecting established forests to actively safeguarding land earmarked for future afforestation. By equating prospective plantation zones with existing forests, the Supreme Court closed a major legal loophole exploited by commercial entities to bypass conservation mandates in fragile ecosystems like the Aravallis.

For environmental law practitioners, regulatory bodies, and mining entities, the ruling provides clear guidance on the absolute protection enjoyed by earmarked conservation lands. It reaffirms that statutory and policy designations for afforestation create an immediate, binding prohibition against commercial exploitation that cannot be diluted by executive inaction or delayed physical execution.

5.   State of Uttar Pradesh v Jai Bir Singh

Citation: State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jai Bir Singh (11.08.2026 – Supreme Court of India; Decided by Nine-Judge Bench; Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 897).

Ratio: The Supreme Court held that the jurisdictional test for defining an “industry” under Section 2(j) of the repealed Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (ID Act) and the standard established by the Seven-Judge Bench in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (1978) remains fully applicable to all pending disputes governed by the 1947 Act. The Court established a strict “firewall principle,” holding that the interpretation of “industry” under Section 2(p) of the new Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (IR Code) must be evaluated independently based on its own statutory text without retrospective application or interference from historical debates surrounding the 1978 precedent. Any judicial recalibration of the legacy “Triple Test” under the 1947 Act cannot be applied retrospectively to pending cases, as doing so would create artificial classes of litigants and undermine settled statutory rights.

The Supreme Court observed that the institutional propriety of referral mechanisms permits smaller Benches to doubt precedent and refer pure questions of law through the Chief Justice of India, affirming that neither res judicata nor stare decisis prevents the Court from clarifying evolving legal regimes. However, the Court emphasized that where a statutory framework has been repealed and replaced by comprehensive new legislation like the IR Code, 2020, academic debates regarding legacy definitions should not cast a shadow over the prospective operation of the new code. The Court noted that excluding public employment or State welfare departments from industrial protections under legacy disputes would leave vulnerable employees unprotected, thereby violating Article 14 equal protection principles.

The Court further emphasized that judicial precedents governing the interpretation of unamended statutory definitions under repealed enactments must remain insulated from new legislative codes. Courts must maintain procedural and substantive separation between legacy claims under the ID Act, 1947, and prospective claims under Section 2(p) of the IR Code, 2020, ensuring that statutory benefits already accrued under the 1978 Bangalore Water Supply ratio are preserved for pending matters.

Applying these principles, the Nine-Judge Bench addressed the maintainability of the reference and resolved the decades-long jurisprudential uncertainty regarding the scope of “industry”. The Court held that pending labor disputes under the ID Act, 1947, including those involving social forestry and state welfare departments, will continue to be governed by the 1978 Bangalore Water Supply Triple Test. Concurrently, the Court directed that future disputes arising under the IR Code, 2020, must be adjudicated strictly according to the explicit statutory text of Section 2(p) without import of the legacy Seven-Judge Bench ratio.

This judgment is significant because it provides crucial institutional finality to labor jurisprudence in India by bridging the transition between the legacy Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the modern Industrial Relations Code, 2020. By creating a clear legal firewall, the Supreme Court protected thousands of pending labor claims from retrospective disruption while giving full prospective autonomy to the new statutory framework.

For labor law practitioners, industrial tribunals, and judicial forums, the ruling provides definitive clarity on the applicable standards for pending versus prospective labor litigation. It re-affirms that while the Bangalore Water Supply ratio continues to safeguard existing litigation under the 1947 Act, the statutory interpretation of the 2020 Code will proceed on a clean slate based entirely on its enacted terms.

6.     Jamnabai & Ors. V Vasudev & Ors.

Citation: Jamnabai & Ors. v. Vasudev & Ors. (20.08.2026 –Supreme Court of India; Decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Karol and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Augustine George Masih; Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 900).

Ratio: The Supreme Court held that an entry in the revenue record neither creates nor extinguishes title to immovable property, as revenue entries exist essentially for fiscal purposes and carry only a rebuttable evidentiary presumption under land revenue statutes. A co-owner’s proprietary interest in joint family property cannot be treated as having been voluntarily abandoned or surrendered merely because a revenue entry subsequently appears in favor of another person, and the underlying transaction (such as a relinquishment or conveyance) must be independently established by the party asserting it. Orders passed by revenue authorities regulation-wise may alter revenue records, but civil courts remain fully competent to determine underlying proprietary titles, which revenue entries follow rather than create. Consequently, a suit for declaration of title and partition by legal heirs is not barred by limitation or by the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 merely due to the absence of a specific prayer for cancellation of an underlying revenue mutation order.

The Supreme Court observed that the statutory presumption of correctness attaching to revenue entries under land revenue codes is purely an evidentiary presumption rather than a presumption of title. The Court noted that in joint family property, possession by one co-owner is ordinarily treated in law as possession on behalf of all, requiring an open assertion of hostile title and unequivocal ouster to set limitation running against non-possessory co-owners. Moreover, the Court emphasized that High Courts exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) cannot disturb concurrent findings of fact recorded by trial and first appellate courts unless such findings are demonstrably perverse or vitiated by an error of law. Reappreciating evidence in a second appeal merely because a different view is possible exceeds the restricted statutory scope of Section 100 CPC.

The Court further emphasized that the burden of proving voluntary relinquishment or execution of a release deed lies squarely on the party claiming divesting of title. Unregistered, vague, or unverified consent letters and revenue statements unsupported by independent attesting witnesses or registered deeds fail to meet the standard of proof required in civil proceedings to extinguish inherited co-ownership rights.

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court of Madhya Pradesh’s judgment that had dismissed the suit on grounds of limitation and non-challenge of the revenue mutation order. The Apex Court held that the respondents failed to establish any registered relinquishment deed or present independent witnesses to prove that the deceased co-owner (Ramprasad) had legally surrendered his share. Restoring the concurrent decrees of the trial court and the first appellate court, the Supreme Court recognized the appellants’ co-ownership rights, directed that their shares be worked out through lawful partition under land revenue laws, and restrained the respondents from creating third-party rights on the suit property pending partition.

This judgment is significant because it firmly re-affirms the foundational real estate principle that administrative revenue entries cannot serve as a substitute for valid deeds of conveyance or relinquishment. By curbing High Courts from overturning concurrent factual findings on title through second appeals, the Supreme Court fortified the rights of lawful co-owners against fraudulent or unauthorized revenue mutations.

For property litigators, civil courts, and revenue authorities, the ruling provides vital guidance on the evidentiary limits of revenue records. It reaffirms that underlying proprietary title remains the exclusive domain of civil courts, protecting rightful heirs from losing inherited land through passive revenue alterations or unproven informal relinquishments.

7.     S Sangeetha & Ors v Tmt. P. Ponni

Citation: S. Sangeetha & Ors. v. Tmt. P. Ponni (07.08.2026 – Supreme Court of India; Decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Karol and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh; Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 813).

Ratio: The Supreme Court held that objections regarding the admissibility or relevance of documents that are prima facierelevant to the adjudication of a suit cannot ordinarily be decided at the threshold stage under Order XIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) merely because the documents have been marked or exhibited in a proof affidavit. The Court reaffirmed the settled principle that the mere exhibition or admission of a document into evidence does not dispense with the requirement to prove its contents, truthfulness, and authenticity in accordance with the law of evidence. Order XIII Rule 3 CPC should not be invoked to eschew relevant documentary evidence at the initial stage unless the material is demonstrably prima facie inadmissible or wholly irrelevant to the suit properties. Unexplained photocopies (xerox copies) of documents, however, are rightly eschewed in the absence of an explanation enabling secondary evidence.

The Supreme Court observed that shutting down evidence at the initial stage prolongs trial proceedings and deprives appellate courts of relevant material if threshold rejections are subsequently overturned. Following the precedent in Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat (2001), the Court emphasized that whenever objections (other than deficiency of stamp duty) are raised during the evidence-taking stage, trial courts should note the objection, tentatively mark the document as an exhibit, and decide the question of admissibility and evidentiary value at the final judgment stage.

setup The Court further emphasized that in civil and testamentary proceedings, the mere filing of a proof affidavit or the marking of an exhibit does not amount to proof of the statements or transactions contained therein. Admitting a document on record merely allows the trial to proceed smoothly, leaving the party relying on the exhibit to establish its contents through primary or secondary evidence as mandated by the Indian Evidence Act.

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the Single Judge and Division Bench of the Madras High Court in a pending probate suit (T.O.S. No. 12/2021). The Apex Court held that while the Single Judge properly eschewed unauthenticated photocopies, the other exhibited documents concerning family disputes, pending litigation, and property transactions bore a direct nexus to the suit and could not be eschewed under Order XIII Rule 3 CPC at the threshold stage. The Court dismissed the appeal, directed the probate suit to proceed on merits, and held that the plaintiff must prove the contents of the marked documents in accordance with law during the final adjudication.

This judgment is significant because it reinforces procedural efficiency in trial practice by discouraging piecemeal interlocutory applications aimed at excluding evidence prior to final hearing. It draws a clear legal line between the administrative marking of an exhibit and the substantive proof of its contents, safeguarding trial courts from unnecessary delays caused by threshold evidentiary disputes.

For civil litigators, trial judges, and advocates handling testamentary suits, the ruling provides practical guidance on handling document objections under Order XIII Rule 3 CPC. It clarifies that tentative exhibition preserves both parties’ rights, ensuring that trials proceed swiftly while reserving final rulings on truthfulness, authenticity, and legal admissibility for the judgment stage.

8.     Renu Mehta & Anr v State of Punjab & Ors.

Citation: Renu Mehta & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Ors. (28.07.2026 – Supreme Court of India; Decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Atul S. Chandurkar; Criminal Appeal No. 3485 of 2026 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4913 of 2026).

Ratio: The Supreme Court held that courts cannot impose onerous conditions requiring the deposit of disputed monetary amounts or alleged cheated sums as a prerequisite for granting anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) in private commercial or civil disputes. The Court clarified that the primary purpose of bail conditions is strictly to ensure that the accused co-operates with the investigation, does not tamper with evidence or influence witnesses, and remains available to face trial, rather than serving as an instrument for recovery of money. Using criminal bail proceedings as execution or recovery mechanisms transforms the bail jurisdiction into a summary recovery trial, which is impermissible in law. Requiring a fixed monetary deposit as a pre-condition for pre-arrest bail is justified only in exceptional, extraordinary situations involving large-scale public fraud or systemic economic offenses affecting society at large, and not in private disputes between individual parties.

The Supreme Court observed that the penal process cannot be leveraged to exert undue pressure on an accused to satisfy civil claims or private financial demands during the pendency of a criminal investigation. The Court noted that where civil remedies—such as suits for specific performance or recovery have already been initiated between the parties over the same transaction, civil courts possess adequate jurisdiction to grant interim protective orders regarding the suit property or disputed funds. Consequently, imposing duplicate undertakings or monetary conditions in criminal bail proceedings is wholly redundant and improper when parallel civil court orders are already operating to preserve the status quo.

The Court emphasized that judicial discretion under Section 438 CrPC must be exercised within well-settled constitutional and statutory boundaries, upholding precedents such as Munish Bhasin v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Ramesh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi). Courts exercising interlocutory bail jurisdiction must refrain from converting bail applications into monetary settlement negotiations or onerous financial guarantees that undermine the fundamental right to personal liberty.

Applying these legal principles, the Supreme Court struck down the condition imposed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana requiring the appellants to deposit ₹4 crore in a fixed deposit to avail anticipatory bail in an offense registered under Sections 406, 420, and 120-B IPC regarding an industrial estate investment. The Apex Court held that the dispute was essentially private in nature and that the informants had already secured civil court restraints preventing the sale of the property. Retaining the grant of anticipatory bail, the Supreme Court removed the ₹4 crore deposit condition, held additional undertakings regarding property sales unnecessary in light of existing civil orders, and directed the police to file the chargesheet within two weeks as the investigation was complete.

This judgment is significant because it firmly reiterates that criminal courts cannot be utilized as recovery forums by private litigants under the guise of bail conditions. By drawing a clear line between public financial fraud and private commercial disagreements, the Supreme Court protected personal liberty from being conditioned upon financial capability in civil-cum-criminal disputes.

For criminal law practitioners, trial courts, and High Courts exercising pre-arrest jurisdiction, the decision serves as a key directive on calibrating bail conditions. It reaffirms that conditions under Section 438 CrPC must remain strictly tailored to securing attendance and fair trial integrity, barring courts from imposing harsh financial deposit burdens in private litigation.

9.     Raziya Begum & Ors. V Nafisa Begum Abdul Hamid & Ors.

Citation: Raziya Begum & Ors. v. Nafisa Begum Abdul Hamid & Ors. (07.08.2026 – Supreme Court of India; Decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. Vinod Chandran; Civil Appeal No. 7225 of 2011; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 780).

Ratio: The Supreme Court held that the non-payment or partial payment of the agreed sale consideration does not render a registered sale deed void, inoperative, or liable to cancellation under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Court clarified that full payment of the purchase price at the time of execution is not a mandatory prerequisite for a valid sale. Under Section 54, a transfer of ownership occurs upon execution and registration of the sale deed, provided the consideration is paid, promised, or part-paid and part-promised. Consequently, where title has passed under a registered instrument, the unpaid seller cannot maintain a suit for declaration or cancellation of the deed; their sole legal remedy is to file a suit for recovery of the unpaid balance along with statutory interest.

The Supreme Court observed that the failure of a purchaser to perform a subsequent obligation—such as clearing the seller’s outstanding debts using retained sale consideration ramounts to a breach of contract rather than a failure of consideration that invalidates the conveyance. Reaffirming established precedents like Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao (1999)and Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (2020), the Court emphasized that title passes according to the intention of the parties as expressed in the sale deed. Once execution and registration are complete, the transaction is binding, and non-payment of the remaining balance remains a purely monetary dispute.

The Court further emphasized that establishing the legal validity of a registered sale deed in a cancellation suit does not automatically entitle the purchaser or their legal heirs to a decree for possession if possession was never delivered or claimed in the original suit proceedings. A declaration of title and the enforcement of possessory rights remain distinct remedies, requiring independent proceedings if possession was not part of the initial cause of action.

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) that had declared two 1975 sale deeds void and restored ownership to the sellers. Restoring the trial court’s decree, the Apex Court held that the sale deeds were valid despite the purchaser retaining ₹4,500 per property to clear bank loans. However, to meet the ends of justice, the Court directed the purchaser’s legal heirs to pay the outstanding balance of ₹9,000 with interest running from 1975 at the rate charged by the sellers’ original creditors. The Court also ruled that actual possession would remain undisturbed with the sellers’ side, leaving the buyer’s heirs to pursue separate legal remedies if they sought possession.

This judgment is significant because it protects the stability of registered property conveyances from being undone due to subsequent payment defaults. By drawing a firm line between a title dispute and a money recovery claim, the Supreme Court prevented sellers from invalidating completed property transactions over unpaid balances.

For real estate practitioners, property buyers, and civil courts, the ruling provides clear guidance on the remedies available in deferred consideration of sales. It re-affirms that registered sale deeds permanently transfer title upon execution, limiting unpaid sellers strictly to recovery suits for the unpaid price rather than seeking to cancel the sale.

10. Mohammed Abdul Ahad & Ors. V The State of Telengana & Anr.

Citation: Mohammed Abdul Ahad & Ors. v. The State of Telangana & Anr. (20.04.2026 – High Court for the State of Telangana; Decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice J. Sreenivas Rao; Criminal Petition No. 17091 of 2025).

Ratio: The High Court for the State of Telangana held that criminal proceedings are liable to be quashed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) where the subject matter, facts, and underlying legal issues are directly covered by an earlier binding judicial decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court of India. The Court clarified that continuing criminal prosecution against co-accused persons when the foundational legal basis has already been resolved in favor of other similarly situated parties under established precedents—such as the Supreme Court’s ratio in Anita Thakur v. Government of Jammu and Kashmir—amounts to an abuse of the process of the court. Consequently, judicial consistency and the principle of precedent obligate the High Court to terminate redundant criminal proceedings to prevent uncalled-for litigation.

The High Court observed that where an earlier Bench of the same Court has already evaluated the allegations arising out of the same incident and applied governing Apex Court precedents to grant relief, the benefit of such legal determination must extend to co-accused petitioners facing identical charges. The Court noted that when the state prosecution does not oppose the applicability of the binding precedent or the factual identity of the cases, maintaining parallel criminal trials against remaining accused persons serves no legitimate judicial or prosecutorial purpose.

The Court emphasized that High Courts exercising inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC must ensure that judicial time and resources are not expended on trials where the legal viability of the prosecution has already been extinguished by controlling judicial authorities. Courts must act swiftly to give full effect to binding precedents to maintain jurisprudential uniformity across connected criminal proceedings.

Applying these principles, the High Court allowed the criminal petition and quashed the pending proceedings in C.C. No. 2004 of 2024 against Accused Nos. 1, 2, 4, and 5 for alleged offenses under Sections 143 (unlawful assembly), 341 (wrongful restraint), and 353 (assault/criminal force to deter public servant) read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The High Court followed its own earlier order dated 02.04.2025 in Crl.P. No. 4628 of 2025, which had applied the Supreme Court’s ruling in Anita Thakur v. Government of Jammu and Kashmir, noting that the prosecution offered no opposition to the applicability of the prior order.

This judgment is significant because it highlights the practical application of binding precedent in quashing petitions under Section 482 CrPC, preventing unnecessary and repetitive criminal trials against co-accused individuals.

For criminal practitioners and trial courts, the ruling serves as an important point of reference for seeking quashment of FIRs and criminal cases on grounds of covered matters. It reaffirms that establishing parity with a directly applicable precedent or prior co-accused order provides strong grounds for the High Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to terminate criminal proceedings.

11.       Krishna Kumar Ojha & Ors. v. Jitendra Chaudhary & Ors.

Citation: Krishna Kumar Ojha & Ors. v. Jitendra Chaudhary & Ors. (01.07.2026 – Supreme Court of India; Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 13671 of 2025; Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 662).

 Ratio: The Supreme Court considered whether a compromise decree could be sustained when the compromise petition had not been signed by one of the affected parties, and there was no clear authorization permitting his advocate to enter into the compromise on his behalf. The Court examined the requirements of Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which requires a compromise to be lawful, in writing, and signed by the parties. The Court held that the compromise in the present case did not satisfy these mandatory requirements.

 The dispute arose from a partition suit concerning ancestral property. A compromise decree had been passed in 1994, and a final decree was prepared in 1997. One of the defendants, whose legal heirs were the respondents, later challenged the decree, alleging that he had neither signed the compromise nor authorized the advocate to consent to it.

 The principal legal issue was whether the advocate could bind the defendant by consenting to a compromise that affected his substantial rights in the property. The Supreme Court held that an advocate generally cannot rely merely on implied authority to surrender or conclusively determine the client’s valuable legal rights. There must ordinarily be express authorisation in the vakalatnama, a special authorisation, or clear proof that the client specifically consented to the compromise. An exception may arise in genuinely exigent circumstances, but no such circumstances were established in this case.

 The Court clarified that although a compromise decree acquires the character of a judicial order once accepted, the court is not merely a passive recorder of the parties’ arrangement. It must apply its judicial mind and ensure that the compromise is lawful and voluntary. Since the defendant’s consent was not established, the essential voluntary nature of the compromise under Order XXIII Rule 3 was absent, making the compromise contrary to law.

 The Court also dealt with the substantial delay in challenging the decree. Although the challenge was made nearly twenty-five years after the compromise decree, the Court held that delay could not be used to perpetuate an unlawful decree where a party’s substantial property rights had allegedly been affected without valid consent. However, the Court carefully limited this principle to the facts of the case and stated that every delayed challenge would not automatically succeed. Whether delay should be excused must depend on a detailed examination of the record and the circumstances of each case.

  The Supreme Court directed that the underlying partition dispute be adjudicated in a proper trial because the basic facts, including the defendant’s participation, the genuineness of the signatures, the authority of the advocate, and the parties’ rights in the property, were seriously disputed.

 The significance of the judgment lies in its reaffirmation that a consent of decree cannot be founded on doubtful or unauthorized consent. It strengthens the protection available to litigants whose property or other substantial legal rights may be surrendered through statements made by their advocates. At the same time, it emphasizes the professional duty of advocates to follow their clients’ instructions and not substitute their own judgment for decisions that belong to the client.

 For the common man, the judgment means that a lawyer’s appearance in court does not automatically mean that the lawyer can sell, surrender, compromise, or give up the client’s property rights. A person involved in litigation should give clear written instructions before any compromise is entered into and should verify the terms of the compromise before the court records it.

12. Arvind Pundalik Tendulkar v Raju K Mathews

Citation: Arvind Pundalik Tendulkar v. Raju K. Mathews (27.07.2026 – Supreme Court of India; Decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Alok Aradhe; appeal arising out of Diary No. 45455 of 2025).

Ratio: The respondent, an advocate, had sued the appellant, his former client, to recover roughly ₹12.5 crore in professional fees, and along with the suit sought attachment before judgment under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Trial Court initially passed a conditional attachment over two scheduled properties, but after hearing the parties, retained the attachment only over one of them  to which the appellant had no objection  and released the rest. The advocate-respondent appealed, and the High Court reversed this partial release, directing that the attachment also extend to a portion of about ₹18 crore in sale proceeds the respondent was entitled to under a compromise decree in a connected suit, over and above the property already attached. A review petition against that order was later dismissed by the High Court too, which is what brought the matter to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court reiterated that the power under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 is drastic and extraordinary, meant to be used sparingly and strictly within the terms of the Rule, never mechanically or simply because a plaintiff asks for it. Its purpose is not to convert an unsecured debt into a secured one, and courts must guard against a plaintiff using it as leverage to pressure a defendant into settling. Before ordering such attachment, a court has to be satisfied on two counts , that there is a reasonable chance of a decree eventually being passed against the defendant, and that the defendant is actually attempting to remove or dispose of assets to defeat that decree. This test is drawn from the Court’s earlier decision in Raman Tech. & Process Engg. Co. v. Solanki Traders.

Applying this, the Court found that the High Court had never recorded any satisfaction on that condition before widening the attachment. It did not think it necessary to go further into the question, though, since the appellant had no objection to the attachment continuing over the two flats making up schedule item 1, and the respondent’s claim still needed some security. On that basis, the Supreme Court set aside both High Court judgments and restored the Trial Court’s original order dated 7 October 2023, disposing of the appeals with no order as to costs.

This judgment is significant because it reaffirms that attachment before judgment under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC is an extraordinary remedy and not a routine litigation tactic. 

For the common man facing a civil money claim, this protects against having bank accounts, property, or sale proceeds locked up pre-emptively without a genuine finding that the money or property is actually at risk of being spirited away.

13. Government of India &Anr v Sri  Devraj Urs Medical College

Citation: Government of India & Anr. v. Sri Devraj Urs Medical College (04.08.2026 – Supreme Court of India; Decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dipankar Datta and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sheel Nagu; Civil Appeal No. 10669 of 2010 with Civil Appeal No. 6710 of 2026 arising out of SLP (C) No. 9079 of 2011; 2026 INSC 799).

Ratio: The Supreme Court reiterated that decisions of the Apex Court are retrospective in application by default unless a judgment expressly specifies that its ruling will operate only prospectively. Reaffirming P.V. George v. State of Kerala (2007), the Court held that judicial declarations of law invalidate non-statutory executive schemes from their inception or from the date the underlying scheme is declared unconstitutional, without creating any indefeasible vested rights to continue interim arrangements. Consequently, courts cannot enforce annual executive subvention obligations beyond the date of the final judgment or require the government to fund full five-year course durations for batches admitted prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality.

The Supreme Court observed that where a party seeks monetary relief or enforcement of equity-based schemes that depend on factual premises such as financial shortfalls or operational losses the necessary facts and supporting documentary evidence must be explicitly pleaded and proved in the writ petition itself. Following Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana (1988), the Court highlighted the distinction between civil pleadings under the CPC and writ proceedings, emphasizing that writ petitions require both factual assertions and proof attached as evidence. In the absence of financial data showing that fee collections were insufficient to meet institutional expenses, the Court assumed that no financial deficit existed to justify extending discontinued subvention benefits.

The Court further clarified that subsequent clarificatory orders such as the Division Bench order dated April 1, 2003, in State of Karnataka v. TMA Pai Foundation protected statutory enactments only to the limited extent of allowing authorities time to bring state laws into conformity with the Constitution Bench decision. Such clarificatory directives did not grant prospective application to the main judgment nor save executive schemes or interim financial arrangements that were rendered unconstitutional by the 11-Judge Bench. Because the subvention scheme provided for annual disbursements rather than a single lumpsum grant for the full course duration, the government was under no legal obligation to disburse subvention funds for subsequent academic years after the scheme died its own death on October 31, 2002.

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal filed by the Government of India against the Karnataka High Court’s judgment. The Apex Court set aside the High Court’s directions that required the Central Government to pay subvention amounts for the entire five-year course period for students admitted during the 2002–03 academic year. The Court upheld the High Court’s order only to the extent that it denied subvention of payments for academic years starting 2003–04 onwards.

This judgment is significant because it reinforces the default doctrine of retrospective operation of Supreme Court precedents and restricts the scope of prospective overruling. It clarifies that executive schemes and interim financial arrangements flowing from pending litigation terminate immediately upon a final declaration of unconstitutionality, preventing institutions from claiming continuing financial rights under invalidated schemes.

For constitutional litigators and educational institutions, the decision serves as a key reference on evidentiary requirements in writ jurisdiction and the survival of interim benefits. It confirms that writ petitioners must attach concrete evidence alongside factual pleadings to establish financial loss and underscores that interim executive schemes cannot outlive the final judgment that strikes their underlying legal framework.

14. Zeba Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

Citation: Zeba Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (11.02.2026 – Supreme Court of India; Decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Hon’ble Mr. Justice R. Mahadevan; Criminal Appeal No. 825 of 2026 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 12669 of 2025; Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 144).

Ratio: The Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Zeba Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2026 INSC 144) represents a decisive turning point in criminal jurisprudence, establishing a standardized framework to enforce transparency, truthfulness, and accountability in bail proceedings. Addressing a pervasive issue where litigants secure discretionary relief by suppressing vital material facts, the Court mandated that every bail application be backed by a candid Affidavit of Disclosure.

The Court clarifies the conceptual distinction between cancelling bail for post-bail misconduct and annulling an inherently flawed bail order at its inception, noting that “an order granting bail is liable to be interfered with where it reveals reliance on irrelevant considerations, ignores relevant material, or suffers from perversity without the necessity of waiting for supervening circumstances.” the Bench observes that “where such an order is shown to suffer from non-application of mind, reliance on disputed or prima facie suspect material forming the subject-matter of trial, suppression or non-consideration of material facts, or disregard of binding legal principles, annulment of the bail order is not only permissible but warranted in order to avert a miscarriage of justice.”

 Such incorrect and incomplete disclosure appears to have materially influenced the exercise of discretion in his favour, thereby vitiating the bail order.” Elevating this principle to a general rule of conduct,  underscores that “an accused or applicant seeking bail is under a solemn obligation to make a fair, complete and candid disclosure of all material facts having a direct bearing on the exercise of judicial discretion. Any suppression, concealment or selective disclosure of such material facts amounts to an abuse of the process of law and strikes at the very root of the administration of criminal justice.”

Beyond individual liberty, the Court highlights the broader public interest and institutional integrity of the justice delivery system. the Court firmly rejects attempts to dismiss grave systemic offenses as mere personal rivalries, ruling that “the existence of a family or property dispute does not dilute the gravity of allegations involving impersonation as a legal professional and the use of forged credentials before courts, which have serious public and institutional ramifications extending far beyond a private dispute.”

This judgment is significant because it converts an informal expectation of candour in bail proceedings into a codified, mandatory disclosure framework, closing a gap that had allowed accused persons  including, in this case, one who allegedly relied on a forged law degree  to obtain bail by hiding their criminal record from the court.

The ruling applies to every court in India hearing a bail application and to every person seeking bail, since the affidavit-of-disclosure framework is meant to be adopted uniformly by High Courts and the district judiciary. For the common man, the judgment means that bail can no longer be obtained by staying silent about one’s past criminal cases or pending warrants; a bail order obtained through such concealment can be cancelled even without any fresh misconduct after release, protecting the fairness and integrity of the bail process for everyone.

15. KKH Finvest Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. Ashiesh Shukla and Others

Citation: KKH Finvest Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. Ashiesh Shukla and Others (05.08.2026 – Supreme Court of India; Decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Kumar and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva; Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 4222 of 2025; Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 803).

Ratio: The Supreme Court’s ruling provides crucial clarification on the extension of arbitration agreements to non-signatories in complex, composite commercial transactions. Authored by Justice Sanjay Kumar, the judgment addresses the referral court’s scope of power under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and reinforces the doctrine of “veritable parties” as articulated in the landmark precedent Cox and Kings Limited v. SAP India Private Limited.

When contractual disputes subsequently arose, KKH Finvest invoked the arbitration clause contained within the MoS. Following an application under Section 11 of the 1996 Act, the Delhi High Court appointed former Chief Justice of India, Justice T.S. Thakur, as the sole arbitrator. When the appellants sought to include non-signatory schedule-holders including Respondent No. 1 and four MT members in the arbitral proceedings, procedural objections under Section 16 led the appellants to file a fresh Section 11 application (Arbitration Petition No. 38 of 2024) to formally refer these individuals to the ongoing arbitration.

In its impugned judgment dated October 21, 2024, the Delhi High Court referred the four MT members to arbitration, reasoning that their SPAs were intrinsically interwoven with the MoS and essential to achieving the composite commercial goal of complete corporate takeover. However, the High Court declined to refer Ashiesh Shukla, relying heavily on Clause 16 of his SPA, which stipulated that the transfer of shares was independent and “in no way connected with any of the remaining clauses” of the SPA and the MoS. The High Court reasoned that referring Shukla to arbitration would render Clause 16 redundant and that no separate arbitration clause existed in his individual SPA. KKH Finvest challenged this selective exclusion before the Supreme Court.

Reversing the High Court’s ruling, the Supreme Court held that Ashiesh Shukla was indeed a “veritable party” to the arbitration agreement contained in the MoS. The Court identified a major oversight in the High Court’s analysis: the SPAs executed by the four MT members contained clauses identical or equivalent to Clause 16 of Shukla’s SPA (such as Clause 24 and Clause 28 in their respective agreements).

Applying the holistic principles of Cox and Kings and ONGC v. Discovery Enterprises, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a non-signatory’s participation in the negotiation, performance, or fulfillment of an underlying commercial transaction can demonstrate an intention to be bound by an arbitration clause. The Court observed that the core objective of the MoS was to transfer 100% ownership of Sensorise to KKH Finvest. Because this underlying performance could not be fully completed without the surrender of Shukla’s shares, his SPA was fundamentally integrated into the composite transaction. Furthermore, recitals in Shukla’s own SPA explicitly referenced the MoS and acknowledged that his share transfer was part of the broader Rs. 8 crore settlement scheme.

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment regarding Respondent No. 1 and referred his disputes to the same sole arbitrator, Justice T.S. Thakur (Retd.), ensuring a consolidated and uniform arbitral adjudication.

This judgment is significant because it strengthens the “veritable party” doctrine, confirming that a person who never signed the main agreement can still be pulled into its arbitration clause if their own contemporaneous, cross-referencing agreement shows they were part of the same composite deal. It closes a loophole where parties structured multi-document transactions specifically to keep some stakeholders outside the reach of arbitration.

For businesses, shareholders, consultants, and other parties to layered commercial transactions, the ruling means that signing a “standalone” side agreement does not automatically shield a person from a related arbitration if their agreement is factually and commercially tied to the main deal. For the common man who holds a minority stake or acts as a consultant in a business transaction, this is a reminder that disclaimers of independence in one’s own contract may not be enough to avoid being drawn into a larger dispute if the substance of the transaction says otherwise.

16. Bhanu Kumar Jain v Archana Kumar & Anr

Citation: Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar & Anr. (17.12.2004 – Supreme Court of India; Decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice N. Santosh Hegde, Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.P. Singh and Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha; Civil Appeal No. 8246 of 2004; (2005) 1 SCC 787).

Ratio: The Supreme Court’s landmark ruling provides critical clarity on the statutory remedies available to a defendant against whom an ex-parte decree has been passed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC).  The judgment delineates the procedural boundary between an application to set aside an ex-parte decree under Order IX Rule 13 and a first appeal under Section 96(2) of the Code, reconciling potential conflicts regarding issue estoppel and res judicata.

The litigation originated from a partition suit filed in 1976 concerning ancestral property. Due to repeated non-appearances by the defendants and non-payment of costs, the trial court passed an order on October 7, 1985, directing the suit to proceed ex-parte, forfeiting the right of cross-examination. The defendants subsequently filed an application under Order IX Rule 7 to recall the ex-parte order, which was rejected on October 31, 1985, followed by the passing of a preliminary ex-parte decree for partition on November 1, 1985.

Thereafter, the defendants initiated multiple parallel remedies. They filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 to set aside the ex-parte decree, which was dismissed by the trial court for failing to show sufficient cause for non-appearance. Their appeal against this dismissal under Order XLIII Rule 1(d) was rejected, and a civil revision as well as a Special Leave Petition were also dismissed. Simultaneously, the defendants pursued a regular First Appeal under Section 96(2) of the CPC before the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The High Court allowed the First Appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in proceeding ex-parte and failed to decide a counter-claim. The transferee of the original plaintiff’s interest subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court.

Resolving the procedural conflict, the Supreme Court held that a defendant facing an ex-parte decree has two distinct, mutually exclusive statutory options: filing an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC or preferring a First Appeal under Section 96(2) CPC. The Court clarified that while there is no statutory bar to pursuing both remedies simultaneously, their interaction is governed by strict rules of estoppel and merger.

However, the Court explicitly ruled that the dismissal of an Order IX Rule 13 application does not entirely extinguish the defendant’s statutory right to maintain a First Appeal under Section 96(2). The scope of the First Appeal in such circumstances is restricted solely to the merits of the suit. The defendant is entitled to argue that the evidence on record brought by the plaintiff is insufficient to sustain the decree, that the suit is barred by law, or that the court lacked jurisdiction.

The Court categorized the grounds available under each recourse as follows: In an application under Order IX Rule 13, the defendant is limited to establishing sufficient cause for non-appearance on the relevant date or showing that the summons was not duly served. In a First Appeal under Section 96(2), the grounds are twofold: challenging whether the suit could validly be set ex-parte (which gets barred if Order IX Rule 13 is dismissed), and assailing the substantive merits of the suit based on the existing record, including jurisdictional defects or failure of proof.

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court held that while the High Court erred in re-opening the validity of the ex-parte order, the respondents were still entitled to have their First Appeal adjudicated on the pure merits of the plaintiff’s case based on the existing trial record. The Supreme Court accordingly allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s judgment, and remitted the matter back to the High Court for expedited consideration on merits.

This judgment is significant because it remains the leading authority on how the remedies against an ex-parte decree interact with one another. It prevents defendants from being shut out entirely just because one remedy failed, while also stopping them from re-litigating the same point twice under different labels, thereby balancing finality of litigation with a fair opportunity to be heard.

For civil litigators and defendants generally, the ruling clarifies which remedy to pursue and when. For the common man who was not able to appear in court and finds an ex-parte decree passed against them, this judgment explains that they may still get a full hearing on the merits of the case through a first appeal even if their application to set aside the ex-parte decree itself is dismissed for lack of “sufficient cause,” provided they had not already lost on the merits through an appeal.

17. Arun Kumar Mandal @ Arun Mandal v. The State of Jharkhand

Citation: Arun Kumar Mandal @ Arun Mandal v. State of Jharkhand (24.08.2026 – Supreme Court of India; Decided by Hon’ble Mrs. Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Hon’ble Mr. Justice R. Mahadevan; SLP (Crl.) No. 2130 of 2026 with SLP (Crl.) No. 2952 of 2026).

Ratio: The order offers a significant clarification on the operational scope of interim protective orders granted during anticipatory bail proceedings. It delineates the precise boundary between safeguarding personal liberty against arrest and the statutory duty of law enforcement agencies to complete criminal investigations.

The matter arose out of Special Leave Petitions challenging orders passed by the High Court of Jharkhand in anticipatory bail applications. During the pendency of the SLPs, the Supreme Court had granted interim protection to the petitioners directing that “no coercive steps shall be taken” against them, subject to their cooperation with the ongoing investigation. When the matters were taken up on August 24, 2026, the counsel representing the State of Jharkhand submitted that the investigation was still underway, that the petitioners were actively cooperating, and requested additional time for the Investigating Officer (I.O.) to conclude the process.

While extending the interim protection until the next date of hearing, the Bench utilized the occasion to explicitly clarify the legal effect of protective phrases like “no coercive steps” in anticipatory bail matters. The Court observed that an interim order protecting an accused from arrest is purely meant to safeguard personal liberty and does not operate as a blanket embargo on the investigating agency’s statutory powers. Specifically, the Bench clarified that such an interim order does not prevent the I.O. from continuing the investigation, gathering evidence, or taking appropriate steps based on the material collected.

Crucially, the Court held that interim protection granted during the consideration of anticipatory bail does not prohibit the I.O. from filing a charge sheet upon the conclusion of the investigation if the evidence warrants it. The Bench observed: “…any interim protection granted by this Court in the matter of anticipatory bail does not imply that on conclusion of the investigation if the necessity arises for filing of a charge sheet, the same is also barred. In other words, once the investigation is concluded and charge sheet has to be filed, the I.O. is always at liberty to do so in accordance with law…”

By clarifying that “no coercive steps” simply guarantees that no arrest will be made while the accused cooperates, the judgment reconciles personal liberty with the state’s duty to prosecute crimes. Notably, this observation provides a distinct perspective compared to the coordinate bench ruling in Satish Kumar Ravi v. State of Jharkhand (2024), where the filing of a charge sheet during an interim protection order was treated as a violation of court directions, thereby setting a clearer precedent on the independence of police investigation vis-à-vis interim bail orders.

This order is significant because it prevents “no coercive steps” orders from being read as an open-ended shield against prosecution altogether. It confirms that such protection is limited to preventing arrest while the accused cooperates, and does not freeze the investigation or stop the police from filing a charge sheet once the investigation is complete.

For criminal law practitioners and investigating agencies, the order clarifies how far an interim “no coercive steps” protection extends. For the common man who is under investigation and has obtained such an interim order, this is a reminder that cooperating with the investigation is essential and that the order protects against arrest, not against the investigation itself concluding with a charge sheet if the evidence supports one.

18. Tejas J. Shah & Anr. v. Mantri Technology Constellations Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

Citation: Tejas J. Shah & Anr. v. Mantri Technology Constellations Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (27.07.2026 – Supreme Court of India; Decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vikram Nath and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Mehta; Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 746).

Ratio: The ruling provides definitive clarity on the territorial reach of a Section 14 moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). The judgment confirms that an IBC moratorium operates solely to protect the corporate debtor and does not act as a blanket immunity shield for non-debtor entities, promoters, or directors faced with consumer litigation.

The dispute originated from homebuyer complaints filed before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) alleging deficiency in service and unfair trade practices against a real estate developer, associated entities, promoters/directors , and landowners.The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Bengaluru Bench, admitted an application under Section 9 of the IBC against the developer company  and initiated the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), imposing a statutory moratorium under Section 14.

In response, the homebuyers filed applications before the NCDRC praying that the consumer complaint proceed against Respondents Nos. 2 to 7, notwithstanding the moratorium declared in favor of Respondent No. 1. However, by an order dated January 20, 2025, the NCDRC rejected these applications and adjourned the consumer complaint sine die, reasoning that the liability of the non-debtor respondents could not be independently examined at that stage and that the alleged deficiency in service pertained primarily to the corporate debtor with whom the agreements were executed.

Reversing the NCDRC’s decision, the Supreme Court held that the scope of a moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC is strictly statutory and cannot be enlarged by courts beyond what the text contemplates.  The Court held that Section 14 applies exclusively to the corporate debtor. Subsidiary companies, managers, directors, or landowners do not acquire automatic statutory protection merely because CIRP has been initiated against the primary developer company.

 The Court clarified that the key issue before the referral forum was not whether the promoters, directors, or landowners were ultimately liable, but whether any statutory bar prevented the continuation of proceedings against them. In the absence of an independent moratorium operating in their favor, the NCDRC was under a duty to adjudicate the complaint against Respondent Nos. 2 to 7 on its merits.

Consequently, the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, set aside the NCDRC’s order adjourning the proceedings sine die, and directed the Commission to proceed with Consumer Complaint No. 13 of 2023 against Respondent Nos. 2 to 7 in accordance with law, while keeping proceedings against Respondent No. 1 stayed under Section 14 IBC.

This judgment is significant because it stops a corporate insolvency filing from becoming a shield for promoters, directors, and associated entities who are not themselves undergoing insolvency. It keeps the Section 14 moratorium tied strictly to the corporate debtor named in the insolvency proceeding.

For consumer forums, insolvency practitioners, and real-estate developers, the ruling clarifies that a moratorium against the builder company does not pause proceedings against its directors or group entities. For the common man — particularly homebuyers who have paid for under-construction flats — this means that if the developer company goes into insolvency, they are not left without a remedy against the individual promoters, directors, or associated companies who may also be responsible for the deficiency in service.

19. Karnataka Apartment Ownership Bill,2026

The governance of apartment ownership in Karnataka is poised for a significant transformation through the Karnataka Apartment (Ownership and Management) Bill, 2026. Passed by the Karnataka Legislative Assembly in August 2026, the Bill aims to replace the outdated regulatory regime established by the Karnataka Apartment Ownership Act, 1972, and the Karnataka Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1972. The necessity for a new legal framework stem from the rapid expansion of multi-story residential housing in Bengaluru and other urban centers, where older statutes failed to handle the complexities of modern multi-unit developments. While passed by the Assembly, the Bill will officially take effect only after receiving constitutional assent and being formally published via an Official Gazette notification by the State Government.

The proposed legislation broadly applies to residential projects containing more than eight apartments, extending to specific villa developments and approved planning schemes. Certain properties under single ownership or individually transferred plotted/villa developments without collectively managed common infrastructure remain excluded. Crucially, the Bill does not supersede the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA). While RERA continues to govern promoter obligations, real estate projects, and initial homebuyer relations, the 2026 Bill operates as a complementary statutory ecosystem dedicated to long-term post-handover governance, dispute resolution, and building administration.

A central focus of the Bill is the explicit statutory link between individual apartment ownership and an undivided, non-exclusive interest in the underlying land and common facilities. The Bill calculates an owner’s Undivided Share (UDS) based on the proportion of the apartment’s private area relative to the total private area of all apartments in the project. Common areas encompassing structural foundations, roofs, lobbies, lifts, parking spaces, utility systems, and community amenities are clearly defined and protected from unauthorized private appropriation or non-statutory conversion by single parties or developers.

To resolve recurring friction between builders and residents, the legislation mandates strict post-Occupancy Certificate timelines for handover. Promoters are required to transfer all original title deeds, sanctioned plans, insurance records, security deposits, advance maintenance, and corpus funds to the newly formed association within specified statutory periods. The Bill introduces a unified statutory framework for Apartment Owners’ Associations, including transition mechanisms for existing Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs) registered under older acts. Notably, it adopts a “One Member, One Vote” governance rule, stipulating that any individual or entity holding multiple units carries only a single vote, thereby preventing developers or institutional investors from monopolizing decision-making.

To combat financial defaults, the framework grants associations enhanced recovery rights by declaring unpaid maintenance fees and associated charges as a legal charge directly against the apartment and its UDS, subject to statutory priorities. Consequently, prospective resale buyers are advised to secure written clearance certificates from the association prior to purchase. Additionally, the Bill introduces mandatory structural safety mechanisms requiring periodic stability assessments at prescribed intervals, categorizing buildings as safe, repairable, or unfit for occupation.

Addressing the challenge of aging and unsafe structures, the Bill establishes a redevelopment framework allowing reconstruction if approved by owners representing at least 75% of the apartments. To protect dissenting minority owners, the scheme includes an independent valuation process; reported provisions suggest non-consenting owners can be bought out at twice the assessed market value of their property. To streamline governance disputes, the law institutes specialized statutory Competent Authorities at local municipal levels with inquiry powers, moving apartment litigation away from traditional civil courts. In extreme cases where an association is proven dysfunctional, the authority may step in to assume management upon a written petition signed by two-thirds of the unit owners

20.       Anil Kumar Singh v. Vijay Pal Singh & Ors.

Citation: Anil Kumar Singh v. Vijay Pal Singh & Ors. (30.11.2017 – Supreme Court of India; Decided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.K. Agrawal and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre; Civil Appeal No. 20007 of 2017).

Ratio: The ruling clarifies the scope of a plaintiff’s right to withdraw a suit under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC. The Supreme Court held that where a plaintiff merely seeks to withdraw the suit without seeking liberty to file a fresh suit, the defendant has no right to object to such withdrawal, except to claim costs. However, where the plaintiff seeks permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit on the same subject matter, the defendant can object and the Court must decide whether such permission should be granted.

The dispute arose from a suit concerning ownership and possession of certain agricultural land. The appellant/plaintiff had instituted a suit for permanent injunction against Respondent No.1 and obtained an ex-parte temporary injunction. Subsequently, the parties claimed to have entered into a compromise, following which the plaintiff filed an application under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC seeking to withdraw the suit. The Trial Court permitted withdrawal subject to payment of costs of Rs.350/-. The Revision Court upheld the order, but the High Court set aside both orders and directed the plaintiff to place Respondent No.1 in possession of the suit land.

Reversing the High Court, the Supreme Court held that under Order XXIII Rule 1(1) CPC, a plaintiff is at liberty to abandon or withdraw the suit. A defendant cannot compel the plaintiff to continue prosecuting the suit merely by opposing the withdrawal. The defendant’s remedy, in such circumstances, is limited to claiming costs.

The Court, however, distinguished withdrawal from withdrawal with liberty to file a fresh suit. Where the plaintiff seeks such liberty under Order XXIII Rule 1(3), the defendant is entitled to object, and the Court must determine whether the statutory requirements for granting such permission are satisfied.

The Supreme Court further held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by going beyond the limited question of whether withdrawal under Order XXIII Rule 1 was permissible. The issue of injunction was governed separately by Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC and could not be decided in proceedings confined to withdrawal of the suit.

Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s order, and restored the orders of the Trial Court and Revision Court permitting withdrawal of the suit. Respondent No.1 was left at liberty to raise questions relating to ownership and possession in appropriate proceedings.

This judgment is significant because it confirms that a defendant cannot force a plaintiff to continue a suit that the plaintiff wishes to withdraw. The defendant’s right to object arises principally when the plaintiff seeks the additional benefit of permission to file a fresh suit on the same subject matter.

For the common man, the ruling means that a person who has instituted a civil suit is generally free to withdraw it, subject to the consequences under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC. However, if they want to preserve the right to file another suit on the same cause or subject matter, they must obtain the Court’s permission and satisfy the requirements of the Rule.